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What Is Race?: The New Constitutional Politics of
Affirmative Action
MARY ZIEGLER
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Fisher v. University of Texas II defied
expectations, upholding an affirmative-action program and opening the door for
universities to adopt similar policies. Using original historical research, this Article
contends that Fisher II matters just as much because of the new challenges it reveals for
proponents of affirmative action. Read together with the Court’s recent decision in
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the dissents in Fisher II lay bare
profound dangers confronting proponents of affirmative action, regardless of the
outcome in Fisher II. In addition to praising colorblindness, the Court has cast doubt on
the very definition of race.
In the past, activists consistently used race to describe the color of one’s skin, but
before Schuette, the meaning of race itself had not played a central part in challenges
to the constitutional legitimacy of affirmative action. As Schuette shows, antiaffirmative-action amici and activists have developed a new argument: a claim that if
race is a social construct, race-conscious remedies are arbitrary, unfair, and likely to
reinforce existing stereotypes. Shaping the Schuette majority, this argument took center
stage in Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in Fisher II. Future challenges to affirmative
action will center on the meaning (and incoherence) of racial categories.
As the new anti-affirmative-action activism makes plain, the question is how courts
can address racial discrimination when racial identities themselves are fluid and
complex. The Article looks to employment discrimination law—and to “regarded-as”
liability—as a framework for judges seeking to address the reality of race discrimination
without reifying racial categories. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
the Americans with Disability Act Amendments Act of 2009 (ADAAA), a worker may in
certain cases seek relief when she is regarded as disabled—regardless of whether she
actually belongs to a protected class. The Article argues that regarded-as reasoning has
considerable potential in the context of postsecondary admissions. In complying with
existing Fourteenth-Amendment jurisprudence, admissions officers already rely on
proxies for applicants’ race. Doing so checks self-serving behavior and better captures
the fluidity of race in modern America.
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What Is Race?: The New Constitutional Politics of
Affirmative Action
MARY ZIEGLER *
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Fisher v. University of Texas II
defied expectations, upholding an affirmative-action program and opening
the door for universities to adopt similar policies.1 Because of the result in
Fisher II, commentators have mostly focused on the potential Fisher II holds
out for universities interested in increasing racial diversity.2 Using original
historical research, this Article contends that Fisher II matters just as much
because of the new challenges it reveals for proponents of affirmative action.
Read together with the Court’s recent decision in Schuette v. Coalition to

*
Mary Ziegler is the Stearns Weaver Miller Professor at Florida State University College of Law.
She would like to thank Jake Linford, Wayne Logan, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Logan Sawyer, Franita
Tolson, and Anders Walker for agreeing to share their thoughts on earlier drafts of this piece.
1
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016) (holding that the university’s
use of race as part of an affirmative-action admissions program did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment).
2
For a sample of the response to Fisher, see, for example, Elise Boddie, Symposium: The Beneficial
Purposes of Race, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 4:21 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/
06/symposium-the-beneficial-purposes-of-race/ [https://perma.cc/RD6Z-P87P] (discussing the benefits
of “general race consciousness” and “intra-racial diversity”); Todd Henderson, Symposium: What Proof
Should We Demand to Justify Racist Policies?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 10:04 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-what-proof-should-we-demand-to-justify-racistpolicies/ [https://perma.cc/5U25-XZMM] (“I personally believe that racial inequality should be the most
important policy issue of the day and that we should make radical changes to our education policy to
give every American child a fair shot at success. But racist policies in higher education seem like an
ineffective and potentially perverse mechanism to do this.”); John Paul Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium:
Moving Forward from Fisher II, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 5:13 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-moving-forward-from-fisher-ii/
[https://perma.cc/4G9F-CBQS] (“The Supreme Court’s decision yesterday in Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin marks a major victory for universities and students throughout the country, and reaffirms
the commonsense proposition that diversity along various lines—including racial diversity—yields
significant educational benefits on college campuses.”); Elizabeth Slattery, Symposium: A Disappointing
Decision, but More Lawsuits Are on the Way, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 1:13 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-a-disappointing-decision-but-more-lawsuits-are-onthe-way/ [https://perma.cc/N9RG-A4V9] (discussing the disadvantages of the Fisher decision);
Kimberly West-Faulcon, Symposium: Surprisingly, Facts Rule the Day in Fisher II, SCOTUSBLOG (June
24, 2016, 9:47 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-surprisingly-facts-rule-the-dayin-fisher-ii/ [https://perma.cc/DAQ6-T9W3] (discussing the differences between racial affirmative action
and racial discrimination).
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3

Defend Affirmative Action, the dissents in Fisher II lay bare profound
dangers confronting proponents of affirmative action, regardless of the
outcome in Fisher II. In addition to praising colorblindness, the Court has
cast doubt on the very definition of race.
In Schuette, Michigan had amended its state constitution to prevent the
use of racial preferences by any university system or school district.4
Rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the Court upheld Michigan’s
law.5 The plurality went to considerable lengths to explain that Schuette in
no way touched on the constitutionality or merits of race-based admissions.6
However, the Court also questioned whether it was possible any longer for
the racial categories used in affirmative-action programs to have any value.
“[I]n a society in which [racial] lines are becoming more blurred,” Schuette
explains, “the attempt to define race-based categories . . . raises serious
questions of its own.”7 The dissenters in Fisher II spotlight this argument,
insisting that racial categories are “ill suited for the more integrated country
that we are rapidly becoming.”8
Studying the origin of the argument at the heart of the Fisher II dissents,
the Article explores the future of challenges to affirmative action. Historians
and critical race theorists (CRTs) have long contended that race is a social
construct—the product of struggles over class and political power.9 For these
scholars, understanding race in this way exposes the institutional racism
concealed by superficially neutral laws.
3

Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for
Equal. By Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
4
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 26 (West 2006).
5
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636.
6
Id. at 1630.
7
Id. at 1634.
8
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2230 (2016).
9
For a sample of historical work on the construction of race, see generally ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT
BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008) (examining the relationship
between race, personal identity, culture, and the ability to achieve citizenship); MARTHA HODES, WHITE
WOMEN, BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY SOUTH (1997) (exploring the history
of relationships between white women and black men and the white South’s response to these
relationships prior to and following the Civil War); ELISE LEMIRE, “MISCEGENATION”: MAKING RACE
IN AMERICA (2002) (discussing the social construction of race as it relates to interracial relationships and
white supremacy); PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE
MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA 1 (2009) (discussing the “rise of a social, political, and legal system of
white supremacy that reigned through the 1960s and . . . beyond”); DANIEL J. SHARFSTEIN, THE
INVISIBLE LINE: A SECRET HISTORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (2011) (detailing the historical background
around three families’ stories and their experience with race). For a sample of CRT work on the
construction of race, see RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2012) (discussing the earliest origins of the critical race theory movement, the
present state of critical race theory, and its future); IAN HANEY LÓ PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (2006) (discussing the relationship between colorblindness and white
supremacy). Although CRT scholars cover a range of topics, the field shares a focus on “race, racism,
and power” and “questions the . . . foundations of the liberal order.” DELGADO & STAFANCIC, supra, at 3.
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For decades, opponents of affirmative action dismissed these arguments
out of hand. In the past, these activists consistently used race to describe the
color of one’s skin, but the meaning of race itself had not played a central
part in challenges to the constitutional legitimacy of affirmative action.10
However, Schuette and Fisher II represent the culmination of a process of
movement-countermovement dialogue and consensus. Far from denying
claims that race is a construct, opponents of affirmative action now use those
claims to their advantage. For anti-affirmative-action amici and activists, the
idea that race is a social construct now militates in favor of colorblindness.11
Since race is a social construct, it is argued to be devoid of meaning. Any
use of race, in this account, becomes an unfair and incoherent allocation of
government benefits.12
Regardless of whether it has stable meaning, race shapes individual
opportunities and experiences.13 When voluntarily assumed, racial identities
can be powerful expressions of self.14 As the new anti-affirmative-action
activism makes plain, the question is how courts can address racial
discrimination when racial identities themselves are fluid and complex. The
Article looks to employment discrimination law—and to “regarded-as”
theories of liability—as a framework for judges seeking to address the reality
of race discrimination without reifying racial categories.15 Under the
10
See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1028–29 (2007) (discussing the use of race as skin color in
colorblindness claims).
11
E.g., Amicus Brief of the American Center for Law & Justice in Support of Petitioner at 3–7,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345); Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial
Watch, Inc. & Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 2–6, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
12
E.g., Amicus Brief of the American Center for Law & Justice in Support of Petitioner at 5–7,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345); Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial
Watch, Inc. & Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 3, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
13
For a sample of the scholarship on racial identity formation, see Charmaine L. Wijeyesinghe &
Bailey W. Jackson III, Introduction, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT:
INTEGRATING EMERGING FRAMEWORKS 1–11 (Charmaine L. Wijeyesinghe ed., 2012); RACIAL
IDENTITY THEORY: APPLICATION TO INDIVIDUAL, GROUP, AND ORGANIZATIONAL INTERVENTIONS
xii–1 (Chalmer E. Thompson & Robert T. Carter eds., 2012).
14
See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Affirmative Action in the Era of Elective Race: Racial
Commodification and the Promise of the New Functionalism, 102 GEO. L.J. 179, 183 (2013) (tracing the
shift in modern America “to a model that places primary emphasis on ‘elective race’ or voluntary, racial
self-identification decisions”); Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations
on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 61 (1994) (“[R]ace, because it is
closely tied to communities, provides an essential component of identity.”).
15
See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being
“Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS.
L. REV. 1283, 1288–89 (2005) (proposing the use of regarded-as theories in the context of Title VII race
discrimination); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy
and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1136 (2004) (criticizing current Title VII doctrine
for failing to recognize claims based on racial identity performance in the workplace). This Article breaks
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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Americans with Disability
Act Amendments Act of 2009 (ADAAA), a worker may in certain cases
seek relief when she is regarded as disabled—regardless of whether she
belongs to a protected class.16 Under such a “regarded-as” theory, what
matters is not that an individual belongs to a particular biological or cultural
category, but rather that the individual experiences the stereotypes
associated with it. Regarded-as theories will allow courts to avoid placing
individuals in one racial category or another. Instead, by turning to a
developed body of law, courts can recognize the reality of discrimination
without reinforcing the fiction of race.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I traces the origins of the
movement-countermovement dialogue from which Schuette and Fisher II
emerged. This Part lays out three influential phases in the history of
opposition to affirmative action. This story begins with the fight led by
Jewish organizations and unions to define legitimate affirmative action.
While denouncing race-based quotas, these activists urged the government
to introduce education and training programs designed to level the playing
field.
In the 1970s, as Part I shows, with a revival of white ethnic identity,
opposition to affirmative action took a dramatic turn. As the Supreme
Court’s decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke17 makes
clear, opponents of affirmative action began challenging the definition of a
racial majority rather than the justice of antisubordination approaches to
race. Identifying themselves as victims of discrimination, a variety of white
ethnics urged the Court to extend constitutional protection to them.18 The
colorblindness arguments now so familiar to scholars of affirmative action
came to the fore when the recently mobilized New Right attacked the core
premise of antisubordination reasoning.
As Part I demonstrates, the ascendancy of colorblindness rhetoric in the
1990s and 2000s concealed a more complex story about efforts to respond
to the diversity rationale developed prior to, and endorsed by, the Supreme
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger.19 Some activists echoed earlier arguments
about the unfairness of race-specific policies. Gradually, however,
new ground by exploring how regarded-as theories matter in a radically different racial politics—one
defined by changing arguments against affirmative action. The Article also offers the first look at how
these theories should respond to powerful new arguments against an anti-subordination vision of the
Constitution.
16
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012); Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes
Under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2062 (2013) (“The ADAAA . . .
protect[s] any individual who is treated adversely because of an actual or perceived impairment without
regard to the existence of any functional limitation.”).
17
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271, 319 (1978) (holding that a
university admissions program that relies predominantly upon race for admissions decisions is unlawful).
18
Id. at 277–78.
19
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that public universities may consider race
as a factor in student admissions, though only temporarily).
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opponents of affirmative action began presenting the very idea of diversity
as incoherent. Borrowing from claims about race made by historians and
CRTs, affirmative-action opponents maintained that the categories
universities used to achieve diversity were arbitrary and unjust.
Drawing on this historical narrative, Part II foregrounds the new threat
to affirmative-action programs articulated in Schuette and Fisher II.
The future of affirmative-action law will depend on more than the
Court’s understanding of how strict scrutiny operates in the context of race.
The fate of affirmative action in the courts will also depend on whether
progressives can reconcile support for an antisubordination vision of the
Constitution with the belief that race is a social construct.
Part III develops a legal framework to address new anti-affirmativeaction arguments about the social construction of race. Looking to ADA case
law and Title VII individual disparate treatment cases, the Article proposes
that affirmative-action law should recognize that individuals may suffer
serious—and adverse—consequences when they are regarded as members
of a particular race. As regarded-as reasoning shows, relevant decision
makers rely not only on skin color, but also on a variety of proxies—
including class, education, place of residence, dress, voice, and name—in
judging an individual’s racial identity.
Part III also confronts potential problems with applying regarded-as
reasoning in the context of university admissions. When students categorize
themselves by race, admissions officers explicitly ask about racial identity,
and minority status often strengthens applicants’ candidacies. An
examination of the Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race in Postsecondary
Admissions issued by the Departments of Education and Justice reveals that
some admissions officers likely already rely on regarded-as reasoning.20 The
use of proxies allows universities to comply with the Supreme Court’s racediscrimination mandates while limiting self-serving behavior. At the same
time, regarded-as reasoning better captures the fluidity of racial identity. The
Article closes with a brief conclusion.
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE ANTI-AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION
MOVEMENT, 1961 TO THE PRESENT

Opposition to affirmative action emerged almost as soon as the first
race-conscious remedial programs took shape. However, the movement
against affirmative action changed substantially over time. Justice Alito’s
invocation of a post-racial society in Fisher II is no accident. Instead, the
argument about racial categories at work in Fisher II and Schuette arose in
the aftermath of an unpredictable and decades-long struggle about the
20
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE
POSTSECONDARY ADMISSIONS 3, 5–6 (2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/docs/guidance-pse-201111.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9DE-SY47].

IN
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meaning of discrimination and race. Understanding the origins of this
argument makes clear the new challenges likely to face universities with
affirmative-action programs.
In the mid-1960s, Jewish organizations and the labor movement
mobilized to oppose what they described as race-based quotas.21 Many of
these advocates, however, claimed to speak for “true” affirmative action—
measures to recruit, train, and fairly measure the abilities of minority
candidates.22 These early struggles addressed the meaning of affirmative
action as much as they did the legitimacy of state-sponsored efforts to
combat racial subordination. In the mid-1970s, the movement began to
change, as a white ethnic revival spread across the United States.23 A variety
of Jews, Italian-, Greek-, and Polish-Americans defined themselves as
minorities deserving of state solicitude. This new argument again assumed
the legitimacy of the basic principle underlying affirmative action.
By the early 1980s, both of these factions began to lose influence, as the
Democratic Party reinforced its support for affirmative action, and the
Republican Party firmed up its opposition to race-conscious policies.24 As
the political parties realigned, conservatives came to define the antiaffirmative-action agenda, linking constitutional values of colorblindness to
a faith in small government and suspicion of entitlement programs. 25
Together, the Reagan administration and the New Right created a new antiaffirmative-action agenda that was inextricably tied to the substantive goals
of the grassroots conservative movement.26
Change defined the story of the affirmative-action movement—shifting
arguments, members, and goals. When we understand the fluidity of the
movement, we can see more clearly that Schuette and Fisher II represent a
new chapter in the affirmative-action struggle.
A. The Birth of a Movement, 1961–1969
The term “affirmative action” came into the American vocabulary in
1961, when President John F. Kennedy issued an executive order requiring
21

See ERIC J. SUNDQUIST, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: BLACKS, JEWS, POST-HOLOCAUST AMERICA
76–77 (2005) (“Many Jews, on the basis of recent experience, remembered racial quotas as a
discriminatory means of denying them access to education and employment.”).
22
See id. at 76 (explaining that Jews showed great support for the civil rights movement’s goal of
achieving equal opportunity and freedom from discrimination but feared the preferential policies of
affirmative action).
23
See id. (noting that Jewish-, Italian-, Greek-, and Polish-Americans all filed amicus briefs that
opposed race-based preferences in the college admission process).
24
WILLIE AVON DRAKE & ROBERT D. HOLSWORTH, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE STALLED
QUEST FOR BLACK PROGRESS 13, 20 (1996).
25
Id. at 16.
26
See id. at 20 (“In the 1980s, the major strains of the conservative attack on affirmative action
were institutionalized in the Reagan administration.”).
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federal employers to take “affirmative action” in combating racial
discrimination.27 Two years later, the executive order was extended to cover
federally financed construction projects.28 Kennedy himself denied that
affirmative action involved or required quotas, but other influential
Democrats, including the leaders of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and the United States Commission on Civil Rights,
came to believe that quotas were necessary to make a dent in the legacy of
slavery and Jim Crow.29 By 1965, the EEOC required employers to submit
forms breaking down their workforce by sex and race.30 Within three years,
states could receive block grants in order to identify disparate employment
patterns; employers could face a variety of sanctions.31 In the meantime, a
debate about the importance of quotas and about the meaning of affirmative
action had begun in the academy and in American politics.
The early anti-affirmative-action movement was complex and drew
heavily from the ranks of the New Deal coalition and the American left.
Since the mid-1960s, members of skilled trades and construction unions had
tended to oppose any form of remedial program for racial minorities,
worrying about the loss of control over hiring and promotion.32 Industrial
unions, like the AFL-CIO, favored affirmative action until such programs
posed a challenge to seniority-based preferences in employment.33
Although the Jewish community would remain divided about
affirmative action throughout the 1970s, organizations like the American
Jewish Committee (AJC) and the American Jewish Congress (the Congress)
also led the first efforts to articulate a vision of a colorblind Constitution.
The AJC was formed in 1906 by Jewish community leaders concerned about
pogroms in Russia.34 In its early years, the AJC focused on protecting the
civil liberties and religious freedoms of Jews.35 By the 1950s, the AJC had
expanded its mandate, arguing that all forms of discrimination based on race
or ethnicity reinforced the bias experienced by Jews and other minority

27

Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. § 301 (Supp. 1961).
See DENNIS DESLIPPE, PROTESTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY
AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 19 (2012).
29
See id. at 20–21.
30
See id. at 22–23.
31
See id. at 25–26.
32
See id. at 27–28.
33
See id. at 28–32.
34
See, e.g., DAVID BIALE, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS IN JEWISH HISTORY 125 (1986)
(discussing the founding of the AJC); Jewish Committee Meets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1907, at 16
(discussing the AJC’s early years).
35
See, e.g., $1,000,000 Sought for Jews in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1929, at 10 (discussing the
early activities of the AJC); Jews Here Reply to Hitler’s Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1935, at 15 (adding
further insight into the AJC’s early activities).
28
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36

groups. The AJC specialized in sociological research documenting the
psychological harms worked by discrimination.37 Indeed, this research
figured centrally in the litigation of Brown v. Board of Education.38
By the late 1960s, however, the AJC had come out against “quotas.” In
1969, for example, the AJC issued a statement favoring what it called “true
affirmative action” while opposing quotas.39 The statement explained:
[W]e cannot ignore the growing concern on the part of many
Jews and members of other ethnic groups that the burden of
needed social changes may especially fall on them and limit
their opportunities for advancement. Care must be taken in
advancing compensatory and preferential treatment for
disadvantaged minorities that our sense of outrage for what
they have endured does not cause us to lose sight of our sense
of the needs and aspirations of other groups.40
If, as the AJC reasoned, quotas were a zero-sum game, other
disadvantaged ethnic groups would necessarily pay the price for the
inclusion of racial minorities.41 Between 1969 and 1972, the AJC and other
organizations refined their arguments. “Individual rights,” the New York
Chapter of the AJC asserted in a 1971 statement on affirmative action,
“which are a cornerstone of our Constitution, must be preserved and
protected.”42 AJC President Philip Hoffman advanced a similar view when
writing to presidential candidates Richard Nixon and George McGovern.43
AJC Vice President Bertram H. Gold summarized this vision, stating that
“the American system, which is an open society, is based on individual
36
For contemporary discussion of such initiatives, see, for example, Two Groups Open Drive
Against Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1952, at 65 (discussing a program “‘to provide a stronger impact on
the American mind concerning the evils of anti-Semitism’ and other forms of racial and religious bigotry
and discrimination”); Survey Finds U.S. Hurt By Till Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1955, at 40 (describing
the committee’s report and its recommendations); 50 Years Marked by Jewish Group, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 1957, at 120 (discussing the AJC’s history and achievements); Civil Rights Gains of Decade Hailed,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1957, at 132 (discussing advancements in the civil rights movement over the prior
decade).
37
See, e.g., STUART SVONKIN, JEWS AGAINST PREJUDICE: AMERICAN JEWS AND THE FIGHT FOR
CIVIL LIBERTIES 66–68 (1997).
38
See id. at 67 (explaining the AJC’s influence on the work of Professor Kenneth Clark, whose
White House Conference paper was cited by Chief Justice Earl Warren in Brown v. Board of Education).
39
Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., Position Statement on Compensatory & Preferential
Treatment in Educ. & Emp’t 2–3 (Nov. 11, 1969) (on file with Am. Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.).
40
Id. at 2.
41
See id. (“It is perhaps inevitable that in the short run, compensatory and preferential programs,
such as those described above will result in some people being adversely affected.”).
42
Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., N.Y. Chapter Statement on Affirmative Action 1 (May 1,
1972) (on file with Am. Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.).
43
See Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., Facts Behind the News 1–2 (Aug. 25, 1972) (on file with
Am. Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.) (discussing correspondence between Hoffman and both President
Nixon and Sen. McGovern).
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rights, not group rights. We are opposed to quotas because quotas are the
negation of judging a man on his worth alone.”44
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Jewish groups like the AJC and the
Congress remained divided about what kinds of affirmative action were
defensible. Founded in 1918, the Congress formed to be a democratic,
representative group for Jewish leaders across the nation.45 In the 1940s, the
organization took a leading role in protesting Nazism in Germany, serving
as a liaison between the United States Government and European Jews
seeking refuge in the United States.46 In the 1950s, the Congress also took
part in the civil rights movement, and one of its leaders played a vital role in
planning Martin Luther King’s 1963 March on Washington.47
However, like the AJC, the Congress viewed the issue of affirmative
action with considerable ambivalence. For example, in May 1969, when the
Congress debated the subject, members disagreed about whether “‘benign’
quotas” deserved support. One member, a professor at Rutgers, maintained
that quotas were necessary to increase the access of racial minorities to
quality education.48 While maintaining that quotas were “deleterious to [a]
democratic system,” others offered alternative methods of helping

44
Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., News From the Comm. 1 (Aug. 16, 1972) (on file with Am.
Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.).
45
On the early years of the Congress, see, for example, Jewish Congress to Meet, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
11, 1919, at 8 (discussing the reconvening of the American Jewish Congress to receive its delegates’
reports from the Paris Peace Conference); Jews Seek Hearing at Peace Table, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1918, at 11 (explaining the American Jewish Congress’ plans to send a delegation of Jews to the Paris
Peace Conference to lobby for full civil and political rights worldwide); American Jewish Congress to
Meet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1918, at 2 (“The American Jewish Congress will convene in
Philadelphia . . . to consider means of obtaining political and religious freedom for Jews throughout the
world.”).
46
See, e.g., Jews Pay Tribute to Hitler Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1943, at 6 (discussing a
memorial service for Jews killed due to Hitler’s persecutions); Wise Asks Roosevelt Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jul.
23, 1943, at 11 (describing the conversation between President Roosevelt and the president of the
American Jewish Congress regarding Jewish casualties in Axis-controlled countries); Embargo on
Exports to Germany Urged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1940, at 6 (discussing American Jewish Congress and
Jewish Labor Committee pleas for a moral embargo against sending American goods to Germany);
Rescue at Once of Europe’s Jews Demanded at Conference Here, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1943, at 1
(discussing demands by speakers at the American Jewish Conference for immediate rescue of Jews in
Nazi-controlled countries and a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine).
47
See, e.g., Irving Spiegel, Jewish Unit To Meet on Civil Liberties, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1950, at
11 (describing Jewish groups’ support of civil liberties); Failure to Attack Bias Is Denounced, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1952, at 20 (“The American Jewish Congress and the [NAACP] . . . assailed Federal,
state and municipal governments for failure last year to take ‘forthright action’ to eliminate
discrimination and segregation and to stop illegal attacks against minority groups.”); E.W. Kenworthy,
200,000 March for Civil Rights in Orderly Washington Rally; President Sees Gain for Negro, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1963, at 1 (discussing pleas by civil-rights leaders for laws ending racial segregation).
48
Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, American Jewish Congress (May 12, 1969), in The
American Jewish Congress Papers, Box 34, American Jewish Historical Society, New York, New York.
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minorities, including “a shift to consideration of the factors of financial and
economic need.”49
Later, at a 1972 meeting of its executive committee, some members of
the Congress favored the use of numerical goals “during a transitional period
until equality [could] be achieved.”50 Other members of the Congress
acknowledged that, while “[t]here [was] little argument that blacks had been
discriminated against by society,” any form of special treatment for
minorities would be unfair and would “severely retard, if not impede
altogether, a full scale assault on the problems of all the poor and
unemployed, which are the real issues and demand major attention.”51 The
organization could not agree even on a compromise resolution stating
opposition to any government program that “require[d], permit[ted], or
[made] predictable any discrimination against any ethnic, racial, or religious
group or groups,” deciding to table it by a vote of 13 to 11.52
The AJC was similarly divided throughout the early 1970s. Some
chapters, including the one based at its New York headquarters, seriously
considered endorsing the use of goals and timetables, and even opponents of
quotas worried that seemingly neutral tests used to measure individual merit
unduly favored those in the white majority, constituting “a denial of the very
merit principle we profess to support.”53
Generally, however, a majority in the Congress and the AJC opposed
quotas while endorsing recruiting and training programs as “true” and just
affirmative action. These arguments echoed the views expressed in Gunnar
Myrdal’s monumental An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and
Modern Democracy.54 Published in 1944, Myrdal’s book argued that
Americans were torn between their ideals and the realities of racism,
segregation, and discrimination.55 Myrdal identified American
commitments to democracy and egalitarianism as important weapons
against Jim Crow.56 He suggested that if Americans lived up to their own
ideals, de jure segregation could not last long.57
49

Id. at 5–6.
Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, American Jewish Congress (Mar. 16, 1972), in The
American Jewish Congress Papers, Box 6, American Jewish Historical Society, New York, New York.
51
Id. at 2.
52
Id. at 14.
53
DESLIPPE, supra note 28, at 86.
54
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY
(1944).
55
See id. at 75, 1021 (explaining the flaws of using the idealistic “class struggle” doctrine to deny
race problems in America, and discussing the American hypocrisy of permitting racial oppression at
home while fighting for liberty abroad).
56
See id. at 1021 (discussing America’s opportunity to amend its past racial failures).
57
See id. (“[T]he great reason for hope is that [America] has a national experience of uniting racial
and cultural diversities and a national theory, if not a consistent practice, of freedom and equality for
all.”).
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Myrdal’s influential ideas reflected one strand of argument offered by
the NAACP in Brown.58 His arguments also helped to cement a liberal
alliance committed to the achievement of civil rights reforms.59 By the
1960s, however, liberal consensus about Myrdal’s arguments had
collapsed.60 Movement activists and commentators argued that Myrdal had
been naive about the pervasiveness of racism in American society.61 Rather
than being a matter of individual attitudes, racism shaped important
institutions and laws.62
For the AJC, by contrast, prescriptions like those set forth by Myrdal
still rang true. The AJC believed that neutrality was constitutionally
necessary and politically possible, and the organization argued that relying
on individual merit would dismantle, rather than reinforce, existing racial
hierarchies.63 At the same time, the organization favored some
race-conscious remedial programs—if only those designed to prepare
58
As Christopher Schmidt has shown, however, reasoning similar to Myrdal’s was not the only
kind of argument used by the NAACP in Brown, and the Court was not obviously deciding the case only
on the basis of Myrdal-style arguments. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Essay, Brown and
the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 207 (2008) (distinguishing “anticlassification”
arguments from “antisubordination” arguments).
59
See, e.g., WALTER JACKSON, GUNNAR MYRDAL AND AMERICA’S CONSCIENCE: SOCIAL
ENGINEERING AND RACIAL LIBERATION, 1938–1987 at 261 (1994) (“An American Dilemma was the key
book in shaping a new liberal consensus on racial issues.”).
60
See, e.g., JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974 at 22
(1997) (“During the racial confrontations of the 1960s, An American Dilemma encountered rising
criticism from activists and scholars who disputed Myrdal’s optimism about white liberalism, as well as
his negative statements about certain aspects of African-American culture.”); DAVID CARROLL
COCHRAN, THE COLOR OF FREEDOM: RACE AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 28 (1999) (“Beginning
in the mid-1960s, many would denounce the book’s view of black culture as a ‘pathological’ response to
white bigotry and find its optimistic prediction of an eventual end to racial injustice naïve.”);
CHRISTOPHER SHANNON, A WORLD MADE SAFE FOR DIFFERENCES: COLD WAR INTELLECTUALS AND
THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 48 (2001) (discussing Ralph Ellison’s mid-1960s criticism of Myrdal’s book).
61
See, e.g., López, supra note 10, at 999–1000 (critiquing Myrdal’s analysis for failing to
emphasize inherent, structural racial subordination as the main reason for inequality).
62
See, e.g., id. (proclaiming that racism is inherent in American society as opposed to only
stemming from the views of irrational bigots). For arguments of this kind from the period, see generally
ROBERT L. ALLEN, BLACK AWAKENING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA: AN ANALYTIC HISTORY 5 (1990)
(agreeing with Truman Nelson’s analysis: “implicit in [Nelson’s analysis] are the conclusions drawn by
black revolutionaries: that the American oppressive system in its totality is ‘unconstitutional’; that this
same system long ago decided and still maintains that oppressed blacks indeed have ‘no rights which a
white man is bound to respect’ . . . .”); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550–1812 (1968) (discussing the history and development of
European and Anglo-American perceptions of blacks, and justifications for race-based slavery);
STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN
AMERICA 4 (1967) (“[Institutional racism] is less overt [than individual racism], far more subtle, less
identifiable in terms of specific individuals committing the acts. But it is no less destructive of human
life. [Institutional racism] originates in the operation of established and respected forces in the society,
and thus receives far less public condemnation than the first type.”).
63
See Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., Statement on Affirmative Action 1–2 (Dec. 3, 1972) (on
file with Am. Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.) (arguing that quotas are insufficient to solving systematic
racism, and urging programs designed to help historically disadvantaged minorities).
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candidates rather than those geared toward hiring or admission decisions.64
The AJC also acknowledged that some tests used to measure individual
merit, if not the idea of individual merit, rewarded membership in a
dominant group rather than actual talent.65
These apparent contradictions made sense as part of the AJC’s
commitment to “true” affirmative action. The organization wanted to
identify race-conscious remedial programs that would not be inconsistent
with ideals of neutrality, individual merit, and equal opportunity. The quest
to defend “true” affirmative action revealed the ambivalence of early
affirmative-action opponents about antisubordination values or remedial
programs. The movement resisted arguments that racism had infected
seemingly neutral institutions and laws. In the early 1970s, however, the
movement still embraced the basic idea of affirmative action as necessary
and just.66
Similar arguments animated the litigation of DeFunis v. Odegaard, the
first Supreme Court case on affirmative action in higher education.67 Marco
DeFunis, Jr., a Jewish man from Seattle, challenged the University of
Washington Law School affirmative-action policy after being denied
admission to the class of 1971.68 The media portrayed the affirmative-action
battle as part of the collapse of a powerful civil rights coalition, a war
between blacks and Jews, between visions of the Constitution based on
ending group subordination or, alternatively, on allowing individuals to
prove their own merit.69 For example, African-American columnist William
Raspberry argued in 1972:
The fight against affirmative action programs designed to help
blacks and other minorities into the American mainstream is
being led by Jews. . . . And it may be that attempts at making
the campuses more representative of the country are seen by
Jews as attacks on their special preserve.70
The Court ultimately held that DeFunis was moot, since, pursuant to an
order from the trial court, he had been attending the University of
Washington Law School since 1971 and was soon scheduled to graduate.71
64

Id.
See id. at 1–3 (discussing the need for truly objective tests in hiring, and acknowledging problems
with allegedly objective tests in the past).
66
Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., Affirmative Action Program Statement 1 (Nov. 13, 1972)
(on file with Am. Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.).
67
416 U.S. 312, 312 (1974).
68
Id.
69
See Nina Totenberg, Discriminating to End Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1974, at 36
(“Arguments in the case are all very proper and legalistic. Yet, for whatever reason, the whole affirmative
action question seems to bring out the worst in Jews and blacks, and their feelings about each other.”).
70
Id.
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DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 318–19.
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Speaking on behalf of DeFunis’s allies, the AJC maintained that affirmative
action was appropriate and constitutional so long as quotas were not
involved.72 As Elmer Winter, the leader of the AJC, explained, “the primary
goal, in our view, is the establishment of affirmative actions and processes
that provide disadvantaged minorities a realistic opportunity in education
and employment while avoiding the dangers of reverse discrimination.”73
B. Bakke and the White Ethnic Revival
Between the decisions of DeFunis and Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, the anti-affirmative-action movement changed
substantially. White ethnics mobilized, contending that they suffered as
serious a social disadvantage as did the people of color for whom affirmative
action programs had conventionally been designed.74 In major newspapers,
white-male academics attacked university hiring policies that favored
women and people of color.75 For the first time, white males brought more
than one hundred Title VII discrimination suits before the EEOC.76 These
activists no longer claimed to understand the true meaning of fair affirmative
72
See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., News From the Comm. 1–2 (Apr. 24, 1974) (on
file with Am. Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.) (“The American Jewish Committee had filed [an amicus
brief], charging that the University’s establishment of dual standards of admission, one for whites and
one for blacks, constituted a quota system and was therefore unconstitutional.”).
73
Id.
74
Claims of this kind are exemplified in various articles. See, e.g., Richard Capozzola, Letter to the
Editor, Bias Against Italians, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1969, at 26 (expressing concerns that
Italian-Americans were being overlooked for top-level appointments); Francis X. Clines, 20 Other Italian
Groups Meet with State Rights Chief in Complaints of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1971, at 15 (describing
a meeting at which concerns regarding discrimination against Italian-Americans in promotion decisions
were discussed); Michael Novak, Black and White in Catholic Eyes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1975, at 33
(exploring the tension between the black and white-ethnic Catholic populations of 1970s Boston, and
commenting on how the two are more similar in terms of plight than they each recognize); Jonathan
Randal, U.S. Challenged by Polish Leader, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1968, at 13 (describing how the leader
of Poland’s Communist party challenged the United States to prove that Polish-Americans were less
discriminated against than Jews in Poland); Walter H. Waggoner, A ‘White N.A.A.C.P.’ Set Up in
Newark, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1973, at 79 (discussing the new legal-aid service established in Newark,
New Jersey for white ethnics in the area); Craig Whitney, Italians Picket F.B.I. Office Here, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 1970, at 35 (explaining how the head of one of the six Mafia “families” led a picket line in front
of the F.B.I. headquarters in protests of anti-Italian discrimination).
75
See, e.g., Iver Peterson, College Scored on Hiring Women, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1972, at 44
(describing how the efforts made to diffuse the myth that affirmative-action policies would result in
reverse discrimination were failing and meeting significant resistance); Tom Wicker, A Misplaced Anger,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1974, at 19 (arguing that the anger harbored by Americans regarding
implementation of affirmative-action programs is misplaced, comparing it to being angry at a “painful
treatment” rather than at “the wound or illness that made it necessary”); Tom Wicker, No Retreat Needed,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1975, at 33 (describing a memo written by the Office of Civil Rights of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that attempted to clarify the meaning of “affirmative
action” requirements for schools).
76
See, e.g., U.S. to Check on Complaints of Reverse Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1972,
at 23 (describing how the United States had appointed an ombudsman to investigate complaints of reverse
discrimination in the college acceptance process).
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action. Instead, activists defined themselves—as Italians, Poles, Greeks, or
Jews—as belonging to a true minority that deserved “special treatment.”77
Ian Haney López has carefully examined arguments about race as
ethnicity.78 He focuses on the importance of studies by sociologists Nathan
Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.79 Glazer and Moynihan described
America not as a racially stratified society, but rather as a pluralistic place
in which culturally distinct ethnic groups competed and collaborated with
one another.80 López is right to acknowledge the influence of this idea, and
he compellingly traces its impact on later thinking about race and the
Constitution.81
White ethnic identity was complex, however, and it arose because of a
number of interrelated social and economic factors. What historian Matthew
Frye Jacobson has called the “white ethnic revival” marked race relations in
the 1960s and 1970s.82 The revival manifested itself in a new national
passion for genealogy and ethnic pride in art, television programming, and
movies celebrating ethnic differences, in public consumption of products
celebrating ethnic pride, and in a new sense of grievance among white
ethnics.83 Between 1967 and 1970, a variety of new ethnic organizations
formed, including the American Committee for Democracy and Freedom in
Greece (1967), the National Association for Irish Justice (1970), the Serbian
National Committee (1968), and the Latvian Foundation (1970).84 In this
77

See, e.g., Capozzola, supra note 74, at 26 (expressing concerns about Italian-Americans being
overlooked in top-level position appointments); see also Randal, supra note 74, at 13 (describing efforts
to challenge the government to prove that Polish-Americans were less discriminated against than Polish
Jews); Waggoner, supra note 74, at 35 (discussing the efforts to oppose discrimination against whiteethnics in the United States).
78
See López, supra note 10, at 1006–11 (discussing the relationship between race and ethnicity and
how it affects the cultural make-up of the United States).
79
Id. at 991, 1007–10.
80
Id. at 1008–09.
81
See id. at 1046–51 (discussing the Supreme Court’s application of colorblind reasoning, and
tracing this doctrine’s development over time).
82
MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, ROOTS TOO: WHITE ETHNIC REVIVAL IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS
AMERICA 8 (2006); see also STEFANO LUCONI, FROM PAESANI TO WHITE ETHNICS: THE ITALIAN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN PHILADELPHIA 9 (2001) (describing the white ethnic movement as it
pertained to Italian-Americans in the 1960s); JONATHAN RIEDER, CANARSIE: THE JEWS AND ITALIANS
OF BROOKLYN AGAINST LIBERALISM 118 (1987); JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 278 (2002) (commenting on the emergence of white-ethnic politics during the mid-to-late
1960s).
83
See, e.g., JACOBSON, supra note 82, at 3–10 (describing a number of ways in which individuals
with ethnic heritage sought to reconnect with their forgotten customs and traditions).
84
See, e.g., id. at 28 (listing various ethnically-affiliated groups that arose during this time period).
For a sample of coverage of the work done by these organizations, see Irish Appeal Seeks Funds to
Rebuild Belfast Street, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1970, at 20 (discussing Irish efforts to raise money to build
new homes in Belfast); Irish Group Pickets B.O.A.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1970, at 13 (describing the
National Association for Irish Justice’s picket of a British corporation); For Greek Democracy,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1971, at 38 (describing the American Committee for Democracy and Freedom in
Greece).
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period, moreover, ethnic consciousness dramatically increased. For
example, a study commissioned by the United States Census in the early
1970s found that a million more people identified as Polish-American than
had a few years before.85
The white ethnic revival partly reflected intense nationalist sentiment
provoked by Soviet intervention in Eastern and Central Europe, the
“Troubles” in Ireland, and the Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1970.86 The revival
borrowed from the rhetoric and the symbolism of the civil-rights movement.
As civil-rights activists invoked “Black pride,” white ethnics wore
tam-o’-shanter hats or waved Italian or Irish flags.87
White ethnics also claimed to have been victimized by past
discrimination on the part of a broader Anglo-Saxon Protestant majority. For
example, the Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, founded in New Jersey in
1978, was designed to “combat discrimination against ‘white ethnics’ at
middle- and upper-management jobs.”88 The organization’s director
explained to the New York Times: “We want no slowdown in the
advancement of blacks and browns, but we don’t want their advancement at
the expense of white ethnics.”89
Such claims made some headway. In 1971, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) offered some assistance to white ethnics but
stopped short of instituting the timetables or hiring goals available to people
of color.90 White ethnic grievance also played out in the courts. For example,
Phillip DiLeo, a rejected applicant to the University of Colorado Law
School, argued in court that affirmative-action programs should give equal
consideration to African-American and Italian-American minority
members.91
By the mid-1970s, a wide array of white ethnic organizations had come
out against affirmative action. These activists demanded a new legal and
social definition of a disadvantaged minority. For these activists,
“minorities” included any distinct group that had experienced past
discrimination and continued to suffer from its legacy. For example, in 1977,
the Jewish Advocate, a magazine in the New England area, complained that
85

JACOBSON, supra note 82, at 48.
See id. at 26.
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See, e.g., John Kifner, 6000 in Boston Protest Bust, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1974, at 19. The
antibusing movement at times used a kind of hybrid flag, combining the American flag with elements of
the Italian and Irish flags. See, e.g., John Kifner, 2 Boston Rues at Odds on Busing, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
1975, at 19.
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Waggoner, supra note 74, at 35.
89
Id.
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See, e.g., DESLIPPE, supra note 28, at 92.
91
See Univ. of Colo. v. DiLeo, 540 P.2d 486, 492–93 (Colo. 1978). The DiLeo court ultimately
held that the applicant lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the University’s affirmativeaction policy, since he lacked the qualifications to have been admitted had no such program existed. Id.
at 489–90.
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existing affirmative action programs “exclude[d] the Jewish community and
other white minority groups in this country.”92 Other white ethnic groups
and conservative activists took up similar claims. As right-wing activist Pat
Buchanan argued in 1977, “the fact is that Eastern European and
Mediterranean ethnic groups really aren’t much further up the executive
ladder than non-whites.”93
When Bakke came before the Court, white ethnics in the antiaffirmative-action movement focused on similar efforts to contest the
definition of minority status. Bakke involved a challenge to the
affirmative-action program in place at the University of California-Davis
Medical School.94 Davis had a policy of admitting “special
applicants” under provisions either for members of “minority groups” (such
as African-Americans) or for those who were “economically and/or
educationally disadvantaged.”95 While many Caucasians had applied under
this second provision, none had been successful.96 The Medical School
rejected the application of Alan Bakke, an American of Norwegian descent,
and he sued, arguing that Davis’s affirmative-action program violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.97
Amicus briefs in Bakke often stressed that affirmative-action programs
should protect white ethnic minorities as well as non-white ones. For
example, an amicus brief submitted on behalf of the AJC and other white
ethnic groups explained:
Nor can all whites by any stretch of the imagination properly
be considered “advantaged.” Rarely, if ever, for instance, have
whites from poverty-stricken Appalachia been singled out as
a group for preferential educational treatment. Nor has
favoritism been bestowed on members of other ethnic groups,
which can credibly claim to have been subject to generalized
societal discrimination—Italians, Poles, Greeks, Slavs—as the
result of which some people bear the economic and cultural
scars of prejudice.98
The Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), an anticommunist, socially
conservative group, raised a similar challenge to the definition of a
“minority” deserving of affirmative action under the Fourteenth
92

Patrick Buchanan, Reverse Discrimination Advocates Must Go, HUM. EVENTS, Nov. 15, 1975, at
9 (quoting the Jewish Advocate).
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Id.
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Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277 (1978).
95
Id. at 274.
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Id. at 276.
97
Id. at 276–78.
98
Brief for the American Jewish Committee as Amici Curiae at 41–42, Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811).
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Amendment. “Jews, Poles, Italians, Japanese, [and] Chinese are all part of
the majority now,” the YAF contended.99
These dissimilar groups have each endured past
discrimination. Who but the most sheltered could avoid
hearing words such as Kike, Dago, Wop, Polack, Chink,
Shanty Irish, and Jap. Yet what protection or special treatment
is accorded these groups who have in the past and still suffer
the effects of overt discrimination?100
Anti-affirmative-action understandings of “minority” status informed
the arguments about diversity and other proposed justifications for
affirmative action offered in Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. The
University had argued that Alan Bakke’s equal-protection argument lacked
merit because whites had not suffered the history of discrimination and
subordination that defined traditionally recognized minorities.101 In rejecting
this claim, Powell took up anti-affirmative-action claims about the difficulty
of defining “minority” status.102 “[T]he United States,” Powell explained,
“ha[s] become a nation of minorities. Each had to struggle—and some
struggle still—to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but
of a ‘majority’ composed of various minority groups . . . .”103
In Powell’s view, minority status reflected a history of past
discrimination rather than a particular, entrenched, deeply rooted racial
hierarchy, so white ethnics could “lay claim to a history of prior
discrimination” as much as could people of color.104 And if everyone who
had experienced past discrimination could benefit from special preferences,
“a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants” would be created and
made vulnerable to discrimination.105
Courts could not competently determine which groups had suffered
more prejudice, Powell asserted.106 Prejudice itself would be ever-changing
and that much harder to measure. “The kind of variable sociological and
99

Brief for the Young Americans for Freedom et al. as Amicus Curiae at 10, Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811).
100
Id.
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See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287–88 (describing the state’s argument that strict scrutiny was
inappropriately applied by the lower courts in Bakke because such scrutiny “should be reserved for
classifications that disadvantage ‘discrete and insular minorities’” (quoting United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))).
102
See id. at 288 (describing the respondent’s argument that the lower courts in Bakke correctly
rejected strict scrutiny on the grounds that minority status should not be restricted to the Carolene
“discrete and insular” standard).
103
Id. at 292 (footnotes omitted).
104
Id. at 295.
105
Id. at 295–96.
106
See id. at 296–97 (finding no feasible “principled basis for deciding which groups would merit
‘heightened judicial solicitude’ and which would not”).
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political analysis needed to produce . . . rankings [of prejudice],” Powell
concluded, “simply does not lie within the judicial competence . . . .”107
Bakke fractured the Court. Two separate four-justice factions joined
different parts of Powell’s opinion, which held that while diversity was a
compelling state interest and some affirmative-action programs passed
constitutional muster, the UC Davis policy went too far.108
Given the deep divide on the Court, the reach of Bakke remained unclear
until the decision of Grutter decades later. Just the same, the opinion
represented an important step for opponents of affirmative action. Powell’s
view of Alan Bakke reflected his agreement with the definition of “minority”
status proposed by anti-affirmative-action activists—Bakke bore “no
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions
program are thought to have suffered.”109 Indeed, Bakke himself could soon
be (or already was) a member of a victimized minority.110 Remedial
justifications for affirmative action did not make sense when one believed
that minority status was ever-changing and that people of color had no
special claim to it.
C. Reverse Discrimination: Opposition to Affirmative Action on the Right
Between 1961 and 1980, opponents of affirmative action often did not
take issue with the basic premise that the State should work to address racial
subordination by offering special, race-conscious assistance to the
disadvantaged.111 Instead, opponents of affirmative action took issue with
what “true” affirmative action entailed or who belonged to “true
minorities.”112 By the early 1980s, however, the challenge posed by the
movement against affirmative action had deepened. The anti-affirmativeaction movement of the 1980s firmly established itself as part of the political
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Id.
See id. at 271–272 (summarizing Powell’s holding that affirmed the lower court ruling that the
UC Davis policy amounted to unlawful discrimination, but reversed the lower court ruling that enjoined
the University from considering race in its admissions policies). Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices
Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens, concurred in the holding affirming the unconstitutionality of the UC
Davis special admissions program. Id. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in
the holding reversing the injunction imposed by the California courts. Id.
109
Id. at 310.
110
See id. at 295–96 (stating Justice Powell’s theory that members of the white majority could soon
be “a new minority” as a result of affirmative action).
111
See, e.g., TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 119 (2004) (explaining that the Nixon administration, while opposed to racial quotas, generally
supported the goal of increasing economic opportunity for disadvantaged minorities).
112
See, e.g., W. AVON DRAKE & ROBERT D. HOLSWORTH, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE
STALLED QUEST FOR BLACK PROGRESS 19 (1996) (summarizing the conservative argument that
affirmative action disproportionately benefits middle class members of minority groups at the expense
of the “truly disadvantaged”).
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right, and different claims against affirmative action took center stage.113
Instead of challenging the definition of “minority” status, opponents began
stressing that affirmative action itself represented a pernicious form of
“reverse discrimination” against whites.114 For the first time, opponents of
affirmative action denied the existence of racial subordination, and argued
that racism no longer made a difference to American society.115 In a
post-racial society, affirmative action became both unnecessary and
discriminatory.
As the YAF involvement in Bakke would suggest, conservatives had
opposed affirmative action for the better part of a decade. Since the early
1970s, neoconservative commentators, such as Irving Kristol and Norman
Podhoretz, had endorsed a vision of colorblind constitutionalism.116 Perhaps
the most prominent conservative spokesman for colorblindness was Thomas
Sowell, an African-American economist who pioneered arguments that
affirmative action actually harmed the disadvantaged minorities it was
intended to aid.117 Just the same, before the late 1970s, “[c]olorblind liberals
were at the helm of anti-affirmative action efforts.”118
By the end of the decade, however, the involvement of the New Right
in opposing affirmative action became more systematic, organized, and
intense. Leaders of the New Right claimed to have risen from the ashes of
the Watergate scandal and from concerns with the Nixon-Ford
administration.119 One of the orchestrators of this movement was Paul
Weyrich, a cofounder of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank,
113
See id. at 16 (identifying conservative opposition to affirmative action as a key enabler of
Republican party’s ability to increase its advantage among white voters in the 1970s and 1980s, and
summarizing the primary ways in which anti-affirmative-action activists evolved their arguments during
that time).
114
See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 111, at 164 (reviewing the 1980 G.O.P. platform, which
criticized affirmative action programs that “exclude some individuals in favor of others”). Ronald Reagan
echoed this argument during his first news conference as president, in which he stated his belief that
“quotas existed in the U.S. for the purpose of discrimination.” Id. at 165.
115
See, e.g., DRAKE & HOLSWORTH, supra note 112, at 18 (summarizing contemporary
conservative arguments that affirmative action was premised on faulty assumptions, because economic
disparities were attributable to factors other than racism); ANDERSON, supra note 111, at 166 (identifying
the beginning of the Reagan administration as the first time a presidential administration signaled a
resistance to affirmative action by advancing colorblindness).
116
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117
See, e.g., DESLIPPE, supra note 28, at 76 (describing how Sowell’s career experiences informed
his opposition to affirmative action and made him a “powerful messenger for the right’s argument” on
colorblindness).
118
Id. at 77.
119
Mary Ziegler, The Possibility of Compromise: Antiabortion Moderates After Roe v. Wade,
1973–1980, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 588 (2012).

300

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:2

and the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (CSFC), a group
dedicated to electing social conservatives to Congress.120
Weyrich saw his mission as the creation of a grassroots,
politically pragmatic Right, a complement to the intellectuals
who had dominated conservatism. He explained to the press in
November 1977: “Conservatives have been led by an
intellectual movement but not a practical movement until now
. . . . We [now] talk about issues people care about, like gun
control, abortion, taxes, and crime.”121
Weyrich’s organizations provided valuable training and money to
fledgling New Right causes: by 1978, the CSFC and other conservative
political action committees, including the National Conservative Political
Action Committee (NCPAC), had raised more than $3.5 million for
conservative candidates.122 While Weyrich provided political strategy for
these groups, Richard Viguerie and his direct-mail organization offered
lobbying and fundraising services.123
The New Right became interested in affirmative action as a “wedge”
issue partly because of its connection to busing and desegregation.
Following the decision of Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County124 in 1968, the Supreme Court and lower courts embraced busing as
a tool used to desegregate schools.125 In 1971, the Nixon administration
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almost immediately made busing a political issue, forbidding use of federal
funds for the purpose.126
By the mid-1970s, the antibusing movement had grown nationally. One
related organization, the National Action Group, sponsored a constitutional
amendment that would end “forced busing.”127 The movement remained the
most visible in Boston, where racial violence exploded in 1974.128 In the
next five years, busing-related fire bombings took place in East and South
Boston.129 During a football game, two white students shot and paralyzed a
black classmate.130 Major antibusing protests spread to cities like Chicago
and Nashville.131
Racial prejudice certainly animated a good deal of antibusing activism.
The movement’s arguments were broader, however. In Boston and Chicago,
for example, protesters stressed their resentment of judicial tyranny132 and
of an ever larger and more interventionist federal government that used
“white children . . . as pawns.”133 Many members of the antibusing
movement were often poor or working-class mothers who, as the New York
Times put it in 1979, felt “that they [had] no control over their future and the
future of their neighborhoods.”134
For the New Right, the connection between busing and affirmative
action was obvious. Both involved the meddling of liberal bureaucrats who
did not believe in the free market, who supported judicial activism, who did
not respect parental rights, and who unnecessarily victimized white
children.135 “Conservatives cannot become the dominant political force in
126
See RONALD FORMISANO, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE, CLASS, AND ETHNICITY IN THE
1960S AND 1970S 61–62 (1991) (illustrating that the Nixon administration played a significant role in
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128
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STORY: WHAT’S WON AND LOST ACROSS THE BOUNDARY LINE (2001); STEVEN J. L. TAYLOR,
DESEGREGATION IN BOSTON AND BUFFALO: THE INFLUENCE OF LOCAL LEADERS (1998).
129
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N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1979, at A16 (describing how court-ordered busing led to racial tension and
violence throughout the area).
130
See id. (providing an example of racial violence during the antibusing movement).
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Mayor Lacks Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1977, at 16 (describing the atmosphere and racial tension
in Chicago); see also PRIDE & WOODWARD, supra note 125 at 71 (explaining how the antibusing
movement created racial tension and protests in Nashville).
132
See John Kifner, 6000 in Boston Protest Busing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1974, at 19 (noting that
members of the Boston community saw the busing movement as an act of judicial tyranny).
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the antibusing movement “drew upon a widespread sense of injustice, unfairness, and deprivation of
rights”).
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America,” Viguerie argued, “until we stress the issues of concern to ethnic
and blue-collar Democrats, born-again Christians, and pro-life Catholics and
Jews. Some of these are abortion, busing, pornography, traditional Biblical
values, and quotas.”136
The New Right had political incentive to tie affirmative action to a larger
conservative agenda. Significantly, in the mid-1970s, changes to party
politics created a perfect opportunity for opponents of affirmative action to
make their cause a core part of the New Right platform. In order to be
effective, opponents of affirmative action had to work with allies in the
Republican Party. At the same time, the Democratic Party firmed up its
support for affirmative action, denying influence to groups such as the AJC
that opposed some affirmative-action programs.
In the early 1970s, it was far from clear that the Democratic Party would
take this position. In 1975, the House of Representatives voted on proposed
legislation sponsored by Representatives Henry Waxman (D-CA) and James
Scheuer (D-NY), stating: “No person shall, on the basis of race, color,
national origin, or sex, be excluded from or admitted to participation in, . . .
or be subjected to discrimination under any program.”137 Between 1974 and
1980, however, the positions of the Republican and Democratic Parties
diverged.
Whereas the 1980 Democratic platform asserted that “[a]n
effective affirmative action program is an essential component
of our commitment to expanding civil rights protections,” the
Republican platform argued that “equal opportunity should
not be jeopardized by bureaucratic regulations and decisions
which rely on quotas, ratios, and numerical requirements to
exclude some individuals in favor of others, thereby rendering
such regulations and decisions inherently discriminatory.”138
By 1980, the New Right had also established a new central objection to
affirmative action. Organizations like the AJC primarily contested the
meaning of true affirmative action. The AJC had conceded that racial
minorities deserved special assistance, nonetheless insisting that judging
people exclusively by individual merit was both constitutionally necessary
and effective in reducing the impact of past discrimination.139 During the
Bakke litigation, white ethnic groups primarily challenged the definition of
a deserving minority.
By 1980, the New Right had rejected the need for any remedial program
for any minority group. Instead, New Right activists argued that
136
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affirmative-action programs themselves represented racist discrimination
against whites. In this account, affirmative action was no longer necessary
because “discrimination [had] been effectively abolished in this country.”140
At the same time, the New Right contended that the free market would
address any remaining discrimination. By contrast, the wrongful
“presumption” of affirmative action was “that the market will not, for the
foreseeable future, operate fairly, and that racial equality requires the
brokerage of progressive-minded bureaucrats.”141
If racial discrimination was no longer a major issue, remedial programs
for blacks represented racial discrimination against whites. As the National
Review argued in 1986:
Affirmative action, as it is currently being used, is quite simply
wrong—wrong because it is anti-white. It seeks to wipe out
the effects of past discrimination through . . . discrimination.
A white male American would be justified in judging that the
Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of reverse
discrimination, has nullified the social contract.142
Between 1980 and 1987, the New Right worked to convince the Reagan
administration to oppose affirmative action. Reagan had a long track record
of opposing race-conscious remedies, and after his election, Edwin Meese
III, one of Reagan’s chief advisors, encountered opposition to efforts to undo
federal support for affirmative action. In May 1981, for example, one of
Meese’s allies complained that “careerist ideologues in the Civil Rights
Division [of the Justice Department]” had endorsed busing and pushed
“through decisions adverse to Reagan policies.”143
Disagreement within the administration became news when Reagan
made a statement at a press conference about United Steelworkers v. Weber,
a 1979 Title VII case in which the Supreme Court held that a white factory
worker was not entitled to enroll in a training program for black workers set
up under a voluntary union-management agreement.144 When first asked
about the case, Reagan had stated that he would approve of such programs
so long as they were voluntary.145 Meese and other opponents of affirmative
140
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action quickly acted to correct Reagan’s gaffe, and the White House issued
a statement stressing Reagan’s belief that the case had been “wrongly
decided.”146
The press conference made clear that civil-rights issues were a public
relations problem for the administration. But in the short term, Meese and
his allies seemed to have their way without popularizing colorblindness
claims. Between 1982 and 1983, the Reagan Justice Department submitted
amicus briefs arguing that affirmative-action hiring programs in Memphis
and Detroit were impermissibly discriminatory, and Reagan made three new
appointments to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, undercutting
opposition to his policies.147
After the 1984 election, however, new internal conflict emerged. In
August 1985, Meese, the new attorney general, went to work behind the
scenes pushing Reagan to endorse a new executive order ending racial setasides in hiring.148 That fall, Meese called a meeting to organize support for
a full-scale retreat from federal involvement in affirmative action.149 During
a heated exchange, Bill Brock, the secretary of labor in the Reagan
administration, led a faction that favored leaving existing
employment-related affirmative-action programs in place, arguing that these
initiatives worked well and were necessary to demonstrate the
administration’s concern about civil rights.150 When those at the meeting
could not reach a consensus, those present produced an option paper
outlining radically different strategies for dealing with affirmative action in
hiring.151
In trying to popularize his positions on affirmative action, Meese took
his case to the media. The claims he forged linked anxieties about reverse
discrimination and antiwhite bias to constitutional arguments about the
importance of original intent and anticlassification values.152 He linked
affirmative action to de jure segregation, suggesting that “a new version of
the separate-but-equal doctrine [was] being pushed upon us.”153 Meese
primarily stressed that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
146
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Amendments made the Constitution “officially colorblind.” As he stated
in a widely reported speech, “[t]he fact that discrimination occurred in the
past provides no justification for engaging in discriminatory conduct.”155 By
February 1986, Reagan took a clearer position, siding with Meese and
calling for a colorblind society where nothing is to be done to or for anyone
because of race.156
As Reva Siegel has shown, legal scholars, sociologists, and members of
the Supreme Court had spotlighted anticlassification arguments since the
decision of Brown.157 Meese and Reagan fused these arguments with popular
anxieties about antiwhite “discrimination” articulated by the New Right.158
The administration had developed claims against affirmative action that
brought together the New Right’s arguments about reverse discrimination,
judicial activism, and original intent.159
Between 1989 and 1994, Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas
(nominated by Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush, respectively)
emerged as strong defenders of this particular vision of colorblindness.160
In 1989, in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,161 the Court struck down
the Minority Business Utilization Plan adopted by the city of Richmond. The
plan required at least 30 percent of prime subcontracts to be given to
minority-owned business entities.162 Writing in concurrence, Scalia echoed
Meese’s claims, stating that “benign racial quotas have individual
victims.”163 Scalia conceded that, in American society, blacks had, in the
past, “suffered discrimination immeasurably greater than any . . . other racial
groups.”164 Nonetheless, racism and racial classifications no longer made
enough of a difference to justify discrimination against whites. As Scalia
explained,
Racial preferences appear to “even the score” (in some small
degree) only if one embraces the proposition that our society
is appropriately viewed as divided into races, making it right
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that an injustice rendered in the past to a black man should be
compensated for by discriminating against a white.165
Because racial prejudice against blacks was no longer institutionalized
or widespread, Scalia suggested, colorblindness was fair to everyone, while
race-conscious remedies represented discrimination against whites.166
Scalia made this point clearer in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, a 1995
case involving federal statutory and regulatory incentives for contractors to
award subcontracts to “socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals.”167 Confirming that strict scrutiny applied to all racial
classifications, Adarand held that racial preferences at issue could not stand
without satisfying strict scrutiny.168 Scalia’s concurring opinion again
endorsed a vision of colorblindness.169 In the absence of a contemporary
racial hierarchy, Scalia argued, race-conscious remedies “reinforce[d] and
preserve[d] for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race
slavery, race privilege and race hatred.”170
Similar arguments for colorblindness dominated anti-affirmative-action
activism throughout the 1990s. In this period, veterans from the Reagan and
George H. W. Bush administrations formed highly organized, conservative,
and professional organizations opposed to affirmative action. Organizations
of this kind included the Center for Equal Opportunity (the Center), the
Center for Individual Rights (CIR), and Judicial Watch, Inc. (JWI).
The Center was founded in 1995 by Linda Chavez, the former head of
the United States Commission on Civil Rights.171 Chavez led the Center
along with Roger Clegg, a former Assistant Attorney General who served in
the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations.172 The Center set out to
be a conservative think tank focused exclusively on racial issues, and its
work reflected the influence of arguments against affirmative action forged
165
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173

in the Reagan administration. Chavez stressed original-intent claims,
reasoning: “The Constitution forbids discrimination on the basis of race.
That includes reverse discrimination.”174 Clegg described himself as a victim
of past reverse discrimination, and he stressed that it was “wrong to
discriminate against people because of their skin color and their ancestors’
country of origin.”175
While the Center studied and criticized affirmative-action programs, the
CIR was a single-issue, public-interest litigation group founded in 1989 by
conservative attorneys Michael McDonald and Michael Greve.176 As early
as 1996, the CIR won a constitutional challenge to the affirmative-action
policy used by the University of Texas, and by the late 1990s, the group led
a full-scale attack on affirmative action in higher education.177 McDonald
particularly objected to claims that racial diversity was important to higher
education.178 True diversity, he argued, came from one’s beliefs and
experiences. By contrast, “[m]ulticulturalism [was] just people who look
different but think the same.”179
A final group, JWI, was founded in 1994 by conservative attorney Larry
Klayman.180 The group first attracted attention by virtue of its legal attacks
on the Clinton administration in the 1990s.181 By the end of the decade,
conservative attorney Clint Bolick took a leading role in JWI. 182 Another
former Reagan administration official, Bolick became a passionate opponent
of affirmative action during his time interning at Senator Orrin Hatch’s (R-
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183

UT) office. During the litigation of Bakke, Bolick became convinced that
Bakke was “a modern-day Rosa Parks.”184
Starting in the mid-1990s, the newly professionalized anti-affirmativeaction movement made its public debut. Perhaps its best-known efforts in
this period involved campaigns for anti-affirmative-action initiatives in
states like California.185 In 1996, Ward Connerly, an African-American
member of the University of California board of regents, led the California
campaign for Proposition 209, a measure prohibiting discrimination or
preference on the basis of race.186 Connerly worked to launch similar
campaigns in Colorado, Michigan, and Washington.187
By the end of the decade, the movement turned to the courts in
advancing an attack on affirmative action in higher education. The CIR held
a news conference in which it questioned the constitutionality of the
admissions policies in place at many universities.188 The Center gathered
data from schools regarding “grades and test scores as well as family
income, graduation rates, and native language” and compiled state reports.189
The CIR, in turn, initiated lawsuits and created a handbook for applicants
interested in suing universities that had adopted affirmative-action
programs.190
Between 1999 and 2003, Judicial Watch, the CIR, and the Center
stressed arguments formulated by conservatives in the late 1970s and 1980s
for colorblind laws and policies.191 However, Grutter v. Bollinger marked a
183
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Limits Affirmative Action, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 13, 1995, at 6 (reporting views that a Supreme Court
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turning point for opponents of race-conscious policies. Grutter came at the
end of earlier struggles to challenge the legitimacy of affirmative action in
court. The case involved a challenge to an affirmative-action program at the
University of Michigan Law School.192 The law school’s admissions policy
required consideration of a variety of factors, including an applicant’s test
scores, grade point average, and “soft variables,” such as the quality of an
applicant’s essay.193 The policy further made apparent that diversity was
accorded “substantial weight” in the admissions process.194 While
recognizing a broad range of diversity contributions, the policy reaffirmed
the University’s commitment to “racial and ethnic diversity with special
reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been
historically discriminated against.”195
Barbara Grutter, a white applicant, was denied admission to the law
school and sued, alleging that the University had relied predominantly on
race in rejecting her candidacy.196 Grutter forced the Court to revisit the
diversity rationale for affirmative action articulated by Justice Powell in
Bakke.197 Significantly, lower court opinions in the case shaped the strategies
used by opponents of affirmative action. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit had relied heavily on Bakke in upholding the challenged
admissions policy, concluding, among other things, that diversity was a
compelling state interest.198
Opponents of affirmative action had to respond to this new focus on
diversity. Already, however, affirmative-action opponents began
questioning the coherence and accuracy of the State’s concept of race. A
brief submitted by anti-affirmative-action scholars contended that ideas of
diversity were “based on racial stereotyp[es]” and made it “permissible to
use race as a proxy for experiences, outlooks, or ideas.”199
The CIR similarly contended that diversity reasoning assumed that
members of a certain group were “particularly likely to have experiences or
perspectives important to the Law School’s mission merely because of their
membership in a particular racial or ethnic group.”200 Amici suggested that
decision limiting affirmative action programs vindicated the colorblindness argument); Ramon G.
McLeod, New Rules for Marking Racial Identity, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 26, 1997, at A1 (describing the
colorblindness position advocated by the Center).
192
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003).
193
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194
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Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors Larry Alexander et al. in Support of Petitioner at *2, 11,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 164181.
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the diversity rationale made little sense, since racial identity did not reflect
a signature experience or perspective.201 An amicus brief submitted by Ward
Connerly took this argument even further, explaining: “Diversity based on
race is . . . meaningless given that Americans are increasingly multiracial
and no one student can be fairly said to be representative of their
race . . . .”202
As we have seen, previous claims about colorblindness had presented
race as a matter of skin color. The Grutter briefs, by contrast, portrayed race
as a generalization that failed to capture the beliefs of individuals belonging
to the group at issue. Connerly’s brief went further, suggesting that with the
increase in the number of Americans identifying as multiracial, race itself
might be a myth.
Grutter ultimately upheld the challenged policy, reasoning that the
Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit narrowly tailored admission
policies designed to achieve a compelling interest in diversity.203 After
Grutter upheld Michigan’s program, the anti-affirmative-action movement
continued its gradual retreat from the colorblindness arguments of the
Reagan era. One new claim made in this period involved the supposed
mismatch between the minority beneficiaries of affirmative-action programs
and the universities to which they were admitted.204 As John O’Sullivan
wrote in the National Review, affirmative-action programs “systematically
mismatch minority talent to academic opportunities, placing the top
10 percent of designated minority students into competition with the top
1 percent of white and Asian students.”205 In this way, O’Sullivan contended
that the beneficiaries of affirmative action were actually worse off than they
would have been in programs to which they were better suited.206 Similarly,
in the Supreme Court, anti-affirmative-action amici less often stressed
anticlassification arguments, instead emphasizing that particular

201
See, e.g., Alexander et al., supra note 199, at *14 (“Michigan . . . assumes individuals generally
believe that members of a ‘minority’ race all share the same viewpoint on all issues. . . . Michigan hardly
needs racial preferences to teach the obvious—that not all members of any given minority think alike.”).
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Brief Amicus Curiae of Ward Connerly in Support of Petitioners at *23, Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 164184.
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Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
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See, e.g., RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT 4 (2012) (arguing
that minorities who benefit from affirmative action are ill-suited for the strenuous pace of elite
universities); John O’Sullivan, Affirmative Action Forever?, NAT’L REV., July 28, 2003, at 15 (positing
that more minority students drop out because affirmative-action policies placed them in a more rigorous
program than they could manage).
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race-conscious programs were not narrowly tailored enough to satisfy strict
scrutiny.207
This shift was evident in 2006, in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle.208 The case involved voluntary integration plans adopted
by school districts in Seattle and Louisville.209 In the Seattle plan, race
served as a tiebreaker when desirable schools were oversubscribed.210
Louisville’s plan also allowed students to attend a preferred school until a
particular institution “reached the ‘extremes of the racial guidelines,’” at
which point the school district would assign students to different schools
partly to achieve a more desirable racial balance.211
In a plurality opinion, the Parents Involved Court struck down both
voluntary integration plans.212 At first, the opinion seems to be a strong
endorsement of the colorblind Constitution. Chief Justice Roberts provided
a clear articulation of the conventional colorblind view.213 As he explained,
Brown recognized and mandated that the Court follow a colorblind
approach.214 “[T]he position of the plaintiffs in Brown . . . could not have
been clearer,” Roberts wrote.215 “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents
states from according differential treatment to American children on the
basis of their color or race.”216 Significantly, in Roberts’s view, “it was that
position that prevailed in this Court.”217
However, Justice Kennedy, the likely swing vote in future
affirmative-action cases, distanced himself from the idea of a colorblind
Constitution: “as an aspiration, [constitutional colorblindness] must
command our assent. In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a
universal constitutional principle.”218 Kennedy laid the foundation for future
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See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae The Center For Individual Rights in Support of Petitioner at
5–6, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-908)
(stressing that the challenged integration plan was not narrowly tailored); Amici Curiae Brief on the
Merits of Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 2, 12, Parents Involved in Cmty.
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-908) (contending that race-conscious
programs are inherently discriminatory and unconstitutional); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal
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opinions holding legitimate the “interest [the] government has in ensuring
all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.”219
Kennedy again zeroed in on the fit between the school districts’ ends
and means. In Kennedy’s view, race-conscious remedies could “be
considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling
interest.”220
Kennedy’s opinion laid a road map for opponents of affirmative action:
activists could focus on schools’ failure to exhaust racially neutral strategies
or to prove that less race-conscious methods could achieve a desired goal.
In practice, this tactic could prove quite effective: schools would have to test
and reject a long list of racially neutral strategies, and districts would face
the difficult task of proving that a hypothetical alternative would not achieve
a similar rate of integration.
Politically, however, Kennedy’s approach appears less promising for
opponents of affirmative action. Narrow tailoring appears to be a technical
question, whereas the idea of a colorblind Constitution is easy to convey and
potentially resonant.221 If Kennedy’s approach shapes the Court’s future
affirmative-action opinions, opponents of race-conscious programs will
have to develop a politically powerful alternative to colorblindness claims.
Two of the Court’s recent racial decisions, Fisher II and Schuette,
showcase the alternatives developed by anti-affirmative-action activists.222
Rather than arguing for an abstract principle of colorblindness, these
advocates question the workability of affirmative action. Borrowing from
arguments made by historians and critical race theorists, opponents of
affirmative action now suggest that the courts know nothing about what race
means.
II.

THE ORIGINS OF THE RACIAL INCOHERENCE ARGUMENT

If read in historical context, the dissenting opinions in Fisher II represent
a turning point in attacks on affirmative action. To be sure, Fisher II invokes
many of the most-familiar arguments against affirmative action. Justice
Alito invokes the specter of racial quotas and the value of racial

219
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223

colorblindness.
However, Alito also embraces a tactic deployed in
Supreme Court litigation since Fisher I, arguing that racial categories
themselves are too incoherent to serve as the basis of any admissions
policy.224
This plan of attack clearly debuted in the litigation of Fisher I, a 2013
case involving an affirmative-action program at the University of TexasAustin.225 At that time, Texas relied on a two-tiered program of affirmative
action—the product of years of litigation and experimentation.226 Earlier, in
1996, in Hopwood v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down
a previously applicable race-conscious admissions plan at the University of
Texas School of Law.227 The program divided students into three groups:
presumptive admits, those in the discretionary zone, and presumptive
rejects.228 A special admissions subcommittee dealt with minority
candidates who fell in the discretionary zone and referred promising
minority candidates to the full admissions committee.229 After the Hopwood
court struck down this admissions program, the Texas Legislature passed the
Top Ten Percent Law, requiring universities to admit the top ten percent of
students from every high school in the state.230 Given the high rate of
residential segregation in Texas, the plan tended to increase the admission
of Hispanic and African-American applicants.231
After the decision of Grutter in 2003, the University also implemented
a program that allowed for consideration of race or ethnicity as a factor
relevant to the admissions process.232
Following a study on the subject, the University concluded that race or
ethnicity could factor into a “personal achievement score,” a measurement
of whether an applicant had confronted “special circumstances” or obstacles
such as growing up in poverty or a single-parent home.233
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See Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2221, 2225 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting the Court’s precedent
favoring a colorblind Constitution and disfavoring racial balancing).
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See id. at 2229–2230 (opining that common racial categories, such as Asian-American and
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In a majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Fisher Court
reversed and remanded a lower court opinion, reasoning that the Court of
Appeals had not properly applied strict scrutiny in evaluating the Texas
admissions policy.234 Fisher did not transform the law of affirmative action,
but the case did mark the appearance of important new arguments against
race-conscious remedies. Some opponents of affirmative action made
familiar claims, contending that the University’s policy would fail true strict
scrutiny because it failed to increase minority enrollment dramatically,
because it was overinclusive, and because there was no strong basis in the
evidence that the program was necessary to increase minority enrollment or
access.235 Two important amicus briefs, submitted by the socially
conservative American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) and Judicial
Watch, Inc. (JWI), turned to a different line of argument. One brief asserted
that even if diversity counted as a compelling governmental interest, “racial
categories [were] arbitrary and . . . incoherent.”236 Racial classifications, as
amici claimed, “[were], for the most part, sociopolitical, rather than
biological, in nature.”237
JWI extensively quoted a statement made by the American
Anthropological Association that “race evolved as a worldview, a group of
prejudgments that distorts ideas about human differences and group
behavior.”238 If racial categories had no scientific validity, and if race was a
sociopolitical construct, then race-based preferences had to be inherently
incoherent and wrong. As JWI contended in Fisher I: “Although science
may have rejected race long ago, law and public policy, and in particular the
University’s admission policy, have yet to catch up. It is time they did so.”239
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For JWI, the idea of race as a social construct first meant that racial
categories are “inherently ambiguous.”240 Racial definitions could be
cultural, personal, or genetic, the brief argues, and individual racial groups
are maddeningly hard to define.241 Would an applicant from Azerbaijan be
white or Asian? Who would decide the racial identity of mixed-race
applicants? In asking these questions, JWI sought to establish that
race-based preferences could not withstand strict scrutiny because race itself
“cannot withstand a moment’s scrutiny.”242 The ACLJ echoed these claims,
arguing that race-conscious affirmative action is “ultimately incoherent, as
racial categories are both incoherent and porous.”243
In Schuette, several amicus briefs updated these arguments.244 A brief
by UCLA professor and noted affirmative-action critic Richard Sander
spotlighted changing understandings of race in modern America. As group
identities multiplied and shifted, Sander argued that “the connection
between these racial categories and underlying types of ‘disadvantage’
favored, or ‘diversity’ pursued, [became] more attenuated.”245 Sander
focused on the impact of “a large and growing multi-racial population.”246
“By what rules is racial membership assigned?” Sander argued. “How does
one prevent opportunistic behavior by self-classifying applicants?”247
The new anti-affirmative-action argument questioned both the
workability and fairness of racial-preference programs. If some Americans
do not belong to any racial category, or fit within more than one, then
someone will have to decide which individuals qualify for assistance.248 If
individuals can select their own racial identity, as Sander suggested, there
seems to be no natural check on self-interested behavior.249 If courts have to
determine racial identity, the argument goes, then affirmative-action
programs will enlist courts in a process that will reinforce—and rely upon—
largely empty racial categories.
240
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A. Schuette’s Definition of Race
Racial-construct arguments played an important, if subtle part, in the
disposition of Schuette.250 The case involved a challenge to Article I, Section
26 of the Michigan Constitution, which prohibited any university or school
district from “discriminat[ing] against, or grant[ing] preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin.”251 Joined by the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,
Integration, and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means
Necessary (BAMN), a group of students, faculty, and prospective applicants
argued that Section 26 ran afoul of the political-process doctrine articulated
by the Supreme Court in a line of cases decided in 1969 and 1982.252 The
first such case, Hunter v. Erickson, addressed a city charter amendment in
Akron, Ohio.253 The city had introduced a fair-housing law prohibiting racial
discrimination, but voters amended the charter, requiring a referendum
before a fair-housing law could be introduced.254 Because the charter
amendment singled out fair-housing laws, Hunter found that the amendment
“place[d] special burdens on racial minorities in the governmental process,”
thereby violating the Constitution’s protections against racial
discrimination.255
In 1982, the Court elaborated on the political-process doctrine in
Washington v. Seattle School District.256 There, the Court dealt with a local
school board decision to introduce busing.257 Voters statewide responded
with an initiative banning busing.258 For the Court, the initiative raised the
same constitutional concerns as the amendment addressed in Hunter: it
“remove[d] the authority to address a racial problem—and only a racial
problem—from the existing decisionmaking [sic] body, in such a way as to
burden minority interests.”259
BAMN and the Sixth Circuit read Hunter and Seattle to stand for a
broader proposition: if a policy “‘inure[d] primarily to the benefit of a
minority’ . . . then any state action that ‘place[s] effective decisionmaking
[sic] authority over’ that policy ‘at a different level of government’” required

250
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strict scrutiny. In a plurality opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy
concluded that this broader reading of Hunter and Seattle relied on an
untenable and unfair definition of race.261 Kennedy explained that to know
whether a law inured primarily to the benefit of a minority, the courts would
have to make sense of who was—and was not—a member of that
minority.262 “Were courts to embark on this venture,” Kennedy explained,
“not only would it be undertaken with no clear legal standards or accepted
sources to guide judicial decision[,] but also it would result in, or at least
impose a high risk of, inquiries and categories dependent upon demeaning
stereotypes.”263
Kennedy also echoed amici’s anxieties about the self-seeking behavior
made possible by fluid racial categories. The plurality explained that
adopting a broad interpretation of Seattle/Hunter would create “incentives
for those who support or oppose certain policies to cast the debate in terms
of racial advantage or disadvantage.”264 The plurality could imagine a kind
of opportunism with few limits: groups could claim a racial disadvantage to
manipulate “[t]ax policy, housing subsidies, wage regulations, and even the
naming of public schools.”265
Concerns about racial construction and racial opportunism also shaped
Justice Scalia’s concurrence.266 While the plurality preserved a narrow
reading of Hunter and Seattle, Scalia called for them to be overruled, and he
did so partly by relying on the problems created by courts deciding what race
means.267 Scalia’s concurrence foregrounds “the dirty business of dividing
the Nation into ‘racial blocs.’”268
For Scalia, racial definition presents two independent problems. First,
courts would have to identify an individual’s race correctly—an exercise,
Scalia writes, that is “as difficult as it is unappealing.”269 Like the plurality,
Scalia put mixed-race individuals center stage. “Does a half-Latino, halfAmerican Indian,” Scalia asks, “have Latino interests, American-Indian
interests, both, half of both?”270 Second, racial identification would rely on
disturbing—and for Scalia, unconstitutional—assumptions that race means
something. To understand whether a policy advances a minority interest, a
260
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court would have to believe that minority members, whoever they are, have
something in common. For Scalia, “such ‘racial stereotyping [is] at odds
with equal protection mandates.’”271
Together with Scalia’s concurrence, the Schuette plurality departs from
earlier attacks on affirmative action. The debate on a colorblind Constitution
turns mostly on questions of principle and philosophy. Do equality mandates
require formally equal—or identical—treatment? Or does equality
sometimes require different treatment to address past subordination?
Schuette operates at a different level. Schuette reasons that regardless of how
one defines racial inequality, affirmative action would require the courts to
label individuals by race and to know what race means.272 Drawing courts
into the process of racial categorization would reinforce racial categories,
strengthen racial stereotyping, encourage self-seeking behavior, and offer no
guarantee that affirmative action would help those actually suffering the
effects of past subordination.273
B. The Meaning of Race in Fisher II
The Court’s decision in Fisher II shows the battle lines now drawn in
conflict about affirmative action. Justice Kennedy’s majority confirms the
legitimacy of university policies designed to increase diversity and leaves
administrators some latitude to consider race.274 Justice Alito’s dissent
suggests that the racial categories used to define diversity are vague,
anachronistic, and hopelessly flawed.275 Whether an affirmative-action
policy is constitutional, it seems, will depend on the validity of racial
categories.
The fault line running through Fisher II began to surface when the
Fisher I Court remanded to the Fifth Circuit to consider whether the Texas
policy survived strict scrutiny.276 There, Fisher urged the court to strike
down the policy because it had only “a de minimis effect” on diversity in the
271
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school. Before UT Austin adopted a race-conscious policy, the University
already had reached a rate of over 21 percent by relying on the Top Ten
Percent Plan, and a race-conscious plan reportedly increased
African-American enrollment by less than 1 percent.278
The majority rejected this “truncate[d]” approach to strict scrutiny.279
Seizing on language from Grutter mandating holistic, individualized review,
the court concluded that the University realistically could have concluded
that a percentage-based approach alone was not enough.280 Nor did the
University do too little to explore race-neutral options.281 The majority
detailed steps taken by the University to increase diversity without explicitly
considering race, including scholarship and outreach efforts.282 Because
African-American and Hispanic enrollment had declined notwithstanding
these efforts, as the court reasoned, the University justifiably looked beyond
the Top Ten Percent Plan.283
The court also highlighted supposed weaknesses of the Top Ten Percent
Plan.284 The scheme achieved diversity by admitting students with
disproportionately low standardized test scores.285 Only by adding holistic
review could the University “reach a pool of minority and non-minority
students with records of personal achievement.”286 In this analysis, diversity
included more than race.287 For the majority, the University’s plan satisfied
strict scrutiny.288
Writing in dissent, Judge Garza concluded that the University’s goals
and strategies for achieving those ends were too vague to satisfy strict
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including those that stem from race, holistic admissions would approach an all-white enterprise.”).
281
Id. at 649.
282
Id. at 647–49.
283
Id. at 649 (explaining that in 1997, the percentage of admitted African-American students fell
from 4.37 percent to 3.41 percent and the percentage of admitted Hispanic students fell from 15.37
percent to 12.95 percent).
284
See id. at 650 (“The sad truth is that the Top Ten Percent Plan gains diversity from a fundamental
weakness in the Texas secondary education system.”).
285
See id. at 652–53 (“[L]arge numbers of students from highly segregated, underfunded, and
underperforming schools . . . qualified for automatic admission to UT Austin.”). For example, in San
Antonio Independent School District, a highly segregated school district, students who took the SAT
averaged a score of 811 and only 28 percent of graduates were college-ready in both English and Math.
In Dallas Independent School District, another highly segregated school district, the average SAT score
was 856 and only 29 percent of graduates were college-ready in both English and Math. Id. at 652.
286
Id. at 653.
287
Id. at 660 (reasoning that under “the plain teachings of Grutter and Bakke,” diversity involved
not only skin color but a “range of skills, experiences, and performances”).
288
See id. (affirming summary judgment in favor of the University).
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scrutiny. Garza faulted the University for failing to define what would
count as a critical mass of diverse students or to explain why race-conscious
measures were needed to achieve the University’s ends.290
Both the majority and dissent in Fisher II rely on familiar racial
categories.291 Some of the briefs submitted in support of Fisher’s certiorari
petition repeated conventional arguments about the stigmatic harms tied to
race and the imprecision of the University’s means and ends.292 However,
opponents of affirmative action treated the case as an opportunity to begin
what Schuette started—the wholesale rejection of race as a concept. “Human
race and ethnicity are ambiguous social constructs that have no validity in
science,” JWI wrote in its amicus brief in Fisher II.293 Any policy relying on
“crude, inherently ambiguous, and arbitrary racial and ethnic categories . . .
can never be narrowly tailored.”294
C. The Battle Over Racial Categories in Fisher II
While Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Fisher II did not squarely
address the legitimacy of racial categories, the Court’s reasoning assumes
that administrators can identify students by race and under certain limited
circumstances, achieve valuable classroom diversity by doing so. By
contrast, in explaining why Texas’s program fails strict scrutiny, the
dissenting justices rejected the idea of racial categories out of hand.295
The Fisher II majority came closest to analyzing the value of racial
categories in evaluating Abigail Fisher’s arguments against the University’s
admission policy.296 First, Fisher argued that Texas could not satisfy strict
scrutiny because administrators had not defined their goal, achieving a
“critical mass” of diverse students, with enough clarity.297 The majority
understood Fisher’s argument to involve numerical clarity—that is, Texas
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Id. at 661–62 (Garza, J., dissenting).
Id. at 667–68.
291
See id. at 656–57, 669 (discussing the different backgrounds and stereotypes related to minority
students).
292
Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5-8, Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 14–981) (arguing the university pursued not diversity
but racial quotas); Amicus Curiae Brief for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence at 2–10, Fisher
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 14–981) (relying primarily on conventional
colorblindness arguments in condemning the university’s policy).
293
Brief of Amici Curiae of Judicial Watch, Inc., & Allied Educational Foundation in Support of
Petitioner at 2, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 14–981).
294
Id. at 3.
295
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215, 2220–26 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(noting that Texas’s justification was too broad).
296
See id. at 2210–13 (outlining the Petitioner’s four main arguments and the Court’s response to
them).
297
Id. at 2210.
290
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had implied a numerical goal without limits. However, Fisher’s argument
also implied a second form of ambiguity surrounding Texas’s goal. How
would the University know that individual students qualified as sufficiently
diverse to create a critical mass?
In rejecting the need for any hard number defining a critical mass, Fisher
II suggested that racial categories can have value to administrators as a
means of reaping the “educational benefits that flow from student body
diversity.”299 Describing the process by which Texas arrived at a “reasoned,
principled explanation,” the majority confirmed that universities could seek
to “promot[e] cross-racial understanding” and prepare students for “an
increasingly diverse workforce and society.”300
These goals would lose value if racial categories themselves made no
sense. How could a university promote understanding between students of
different races if race itself was an arbitrary fiction? In that case, what kind
of understanding could students gain? And if racial categories are artificial
constructs, how could the university prepare students for a more diverse
workforce by adopting race-conscious policies? If racial categories have less
and less meaning, would a university not better prepare students for a diverse
workforce by jettisoning race-conscious policies? The majority implies its
answer to these questions in its analysis of Texas’s goals. If cross-racial
understanding and preparation for a diverse workforce are principled goals,
the majority sees the possibility of racial categories having some inherent
worth.301
The remainder of the majority opinion bolsters this understanding of
racial categories. Fisher argued that any race-conscious policy was
unnecessary because Texas had already achieved a “critical mass” through
its Top Ten Percent Plan and because “race-neutral holistic review” had
made only a minimal difference.302 In refuting Fisher’s critical-mass
argument, the majority walked through empirical and anecdotal evidence
documenting the experience and admission rates of “African-American,”
“Hispanic,” and “Asian” applicants.303 The validity of these categories is at
the center of the Court’s analysis of a critical mass.304
298

Id.
Id. at 2210 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013)).
300
Id. at 2211.
301
See id. at 2210–12 (“‘The use of race-neutral policies and programs ha[d] not been successful’
in ‘provid[ing] an educational setting that fosters cross-racial understanding, provid[ing] enlightened
discussion and learning, [or] prepar[ing] students to function in an increasingly diverse workforce or
society.’”).
302
See id. at 2211–12 (explaining that Petitioner argued that the Top Ten Percent Plan helped to
achieve a critical mass).
303
See id. at 2212 (noting that 4.1 percent of African-Americans enrolled in 2003, while percentages
for Hispanic and Asian-Americans were similar).
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See id.
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The Court relied on the same racial categories in explaining that Texas’s
holistic review had a “meaningful, if still limited, effect on the diversity of
the University’s freshman class.”305 Even the Court’s analysis of Fisher’s
final suggestion—that Texas admit all diverse students through a percentage
plan—assumed that race was a real, identifiable thing.306 The majority
rejected Fisher’s proposal because it would “sacrifice all other aspects of
diversity in pursuit of enrolling a higher number of minority students.”307
The Court compared racial identities to other, unquestionably real
experiences or traits. A racially diverse student could be as readily identified
as a “star athlete or musician” or a “talented young biologist.”308
The dissenting justices took a dramatically different position on the
validity of racial categories. Justice Alito’s dissent began in familiar
territory, reiterating that “[d]istinctions between citizens based solely on
their ancestry are by their nature odious to a free people.”309 Alito also
accepted Fisher’s argument that Texas had not defined “critical mass”
clearly enough.310 By accepting the Texas’ “self-serving” explanation of its
own goals, as Alito saw it, the majority deferred far more to administrators
than strict-scrutiny review would permit.311
When explaining that Texas’s admissions plan was not narrowly
tailored, Alito’s dissent took a new direction. The dissenting justices adopted
arguments about the incoherence of racial categories championed for some
time by opponents of affirmative action. Alito began by noting that Texas’s
policy “discriminate[d] against Asian-Americans.”312 Alito took Texas to
task for favoring some minority groups over others, but his dissent more
heavily criticized Texas’s use of “crude, overly simplistic racial . . .
categories.”313 Returning to the “Asian-American” category, Alito mocked
Texas’s definition of race, noting that the Asian category covered “60% of
the world’s population.”314 “It would be ludicrous,” Alito wrote, “to suggest
that all of these students have similar backgrounds and similar ideas and
experiences to share.”315
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Id.
See id. at 2212–13 (outlining the demographics of the UT Austin student body).
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Id. at 2213.
308
Id.
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Id. at 2221 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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See id. at 2222–24 (describing how UT has never clearly defined what it means by “critical
mass”).
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See id. at 2223 (noting that this Court has already faulted the Fifth Circuit for giving too much
deference to a university’s racial-classification policy).
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Alito then directly attacked the very idea of a racial category. Noting
that Texas had never defined who belonged in each of the five categories
used in its admission policy, Alito borrowed directly from arguments made
by opponents of affirmative action.317 He reasoned that mixed-race students,
many of whom claimed ancestry from several of the categories Texas used,
would soon make any clean definition of race deeply problematic.318 How,
in a post-racial world, could Texas know when a student would have “a
distinctive perspective or set of experiences associated with [a particular]
group?”319
Alito also invoked the specter of self-serving behavior of which
opponents of affirmative action had warned.320 If it was no longer possible
to coherently define racial categories, Texas had to rely on students to claim
a racial identity for themselves.321 “This,” Alito wrote, “is an invitation for
applicants to game the system.”322
The Court’s opinion showcases where the war over affirmative action is
headed. Proponents of affirmative action will have to respond to opposition
arguments about the ambiguity and instability of race. Part III next considers
one strategy for addressing this new attack on affirmative action.
III.

THE PROMISE OF “REGARDED-AS” REASONING

The problem, of course, is that racial thinking shapes individual
experience and outcomes, regardless of the biological validity of racial
categories. Individual background, in turn, can determine others’
perceptions of race. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY), a recent study conducted by Professors Aliya Saperstein and
Andrew Penner found that changes in individual economic circumstances
affected how interviewers defined a person’s race: interviewers more often
identified a subject as a minority when she was unemployed, facing criminal
charges, or otherwise struggling.323 In another study, Saperstein and her
colleagues explored how funeral directors categorized those who had passed
316
See id. at 2229–30 (discussing how the country is becoming more mixed racially, which will
make classifying as one of five categories difficult).
317
Id.
318
See id. (discussing how many students will have parents or grandparents who fit more than one
of the designated race categories).
319
Id. at 2230.
320
Brief for Petitioner at 42, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 11-345).
321
Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2230 (Alito, J., dissenting).
322
Id.
323
See Andrew Penner & Aliya Saperstein, How Social Status Shapes Race, 105 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE NAT. ACAD. OF SCI. 19628, 19628 (2008) (reporting that individuals who had been identified as
white previously were less likely to be seen as white again if they were currently incarcerated,
unemployed, or had household incomes below the poverty line, and individuals who had been identified
as black were likely to be identified as black again if they fell into any of these categories).
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away. Again, economic and other life circumstances determined the
outcome: people who had been murdered were categorized as African
American, even when loved ones had identified the deceased as belonging
to another race.325 As these studies make apparent, economic and social
stereotypes still mark our perceptions of one another. Proxies for race,
including class, criminal history, and place of residence, all help to
determine how an individual is categorized.
These stereotypes also make a significant difference in individuals’
lives. Research by Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan found a 50percent gap in callbacks for those with stereotypically “black” names on
their resumes compared to those with stereotypically white names.326 This
effect applied regardless of the “real” race of an applicant—an individual’s
name brought to mind race and all it represented for many prospective
employers.327 Professors Douglas Massey and Garvey Lundy found a similar
effect when measuring the ability of fictitious prospective tenants to get
through to a rental agent.328 Study subjects spoke on the phone using either
White Middle Class English, Black English Vernacular, or Black Accented
English.329 Race, sex, and class—determined by speech alone—helped to
dictate an individual’s access to a landlord and to a rental unit.330 For
example, the study found that 87 percent of white males were able to get
through to a rental agent, compared with only 63 percent of females speaking
in Black English Vernacular.331
The skepticism about racial definitions expressed by Fisher II offers no
guidance for how to deal with the difference made by perceptions of race,
however inaccurate.332 If racial categories are totally incoherent, and
324

See Andrew Penner, Andrew Noymer & Aliya Saperstein, Cause of Death Affects Racial
Classification on Death Certificates, 6 PLOS ONE e15812, e15812 (2011) (hypothesizing that
well-known racial disparities in cause of death may lead decision makers to classify the deceased as the
wrong race).
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See id. (finding that 1.1 percent of next of kin classify the decedent differently than was recorded
in the official statistics, and that the odds of being classified as black if you were a homicide victim were
higher).
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Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 992
(2004).
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See id. at 991–92, 997–98 (explaining that the difference in callback rates can only be attributed
to manipulation of the applicants’ names).
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See Douglas S. Massey & Garvey Lundy, Use of Black English and Racial Discrimination in
Urban Housing Markets: New Methods and Findings, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 452, 466–67 (2001)
(explaining that racial discrimination occurs based solely on verbal interaction over the phone).
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Id. at 456.
330
See id. at 460–61 (explaining that white males had to make fewer calls to reach a rental agent
than black males, men had to make fewer calls than women, and middle-class blacks had to make fewer
calls than low-class blacks).
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Id.
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See supra Part II.C.

2018]

WHAT IS RACE?

325

individuals (particularly mixed-race ones) have no “real” race, then the
colorblindness paradigm will need reworking. As scholars often recognize,
the courts often use “color” and “race” synonymously, treating both as
biological labels rather than as social constructs.333 For example, under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the courts use skin color or
other salient physical features as shorthand for membership in a particular
group.334 To know if someone has suffered racial discrimination, the final
prong of McDonnell Douglas often requires courts to decide whether an
individual was treated differently than similarly situated employees.335 If
that employee was replaced by someone of the same race—defined by the
person’s physical traits—then discrimination becomes much harder to
prove.336 Even in Fourteenth Amendment cases, to make sense of the idea
that someone suffered discrimination “because of race” logically requires a
court to know what race that person was or was perceived to be.
How, then, should courts address the dangers of racial categorization
foregrounded in Schuette and Fisher II,337 and emphasized by
affirmative-action opponents, without ignoring the reality of racial
stereotyping in modern America? This Article suggests that courts should
look at an established body of law addressing whether a worker is “regarded
as” belonging to a disfavored group. Most developed in the context of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, “regarded-as” cases get at the root of the
problem with racial stereotyping.338 If personal circumstances determine
how one’s race is defined, and if racial stereotypes can dictate certain
individual outcomes, then what matters to the law of affirmative action
should be how relevant decision makers perceive race to be.
Using “regarded-as” cases as a starting point also helps to address some
of the problems raised by Schuette and Fisher II. Together with a handful of
cases decided under Title VII, this body of law could provide badly needed
guidance for courts forced to determine whether or not an individual was
333

See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks, Race as an Under-Inclusive and Over-Inclusive Concept, 1 AFR.-AM.
L. & POL’Y REP. 9, 12–27 (1994) (arguing that “racial categories should be defined by the common
experience of cultural subordination,” and explaining that the civil rights conception of race is too narrow
because it looks separately at experiences of social groups and too broad because it ignores intra-racial
distinctions); Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 15, at 1293–94 (explaining that courts’ focus on
“biological” race results in employers discriminating based on characteristics, such as appearance, which
cannot be linked to the employee’s “visible” race); Rich, supra note 15, at 1140 (describing the effects
of judicial treatment of race as a physical concept rather than a social construct).
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Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 15, at 1293–94.
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Id.
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Id. at 1294.
337
See supra pp. 35–38.
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See Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 15, at 1289 (arguing that courts should recognize
discrimination claims based on presumptions of a certain characteristic, such as being “regarded as”
black, which includes any corresponding negative stereotypes); see also Michele Goodwin, Race as
Proxy: An Introduction, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 931, 932 (2004) (describing the historical “collective
negative imaging of blacks” as too immature and intellectually inferior to be granted fundamental rights).
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judged because of race. Without adjudicating that person’s identity or
reaffirming racial categories, courts could return to a relatively familiar
question involving how that person was perceived. As importantly, as
Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Mario Barnes have argued, “regarded-as”
cases recognize the harm individuals experience because of negative, and
often inaccurate, stereotypes.339
But how would regarded-as reasoning apply in the dramatically different
context of postsecondary admissions? Whereas race can make it harder for
workers to get or keep a job, university affirmative-action programs treat
race as a plus, and applicants often identify themselves, thereby increasing
the chances of self-serving behavior. Moreover, the kind of evidence central
to employment cases seems inapplicable in the context of admissions, where
officers often rely on the content of a written application.
However, as the official guidance issued by the Departments of
Education and Justice suggests, some admissions officers likely already rely
on regarded-as reasoning.340 Because the Court’s recent affirmative-action
decisions allow for race-conscious remedies only as a measure of last
resort,341 admissions officers seem to fall back on proxies thought to identify
minorities. Regarded-as reasoning allows admissions officers to comply
with the Court’s mandate.
By explicitly recognizing the way in which racial identification often
operates, the Court can address the problem affirmative action opponents
raised in Schuette and Fisher II. Focusing on a person’s perceived race—
rather than on skin color or any other pseudobiological category—would
create a jurisprudence that better reflects the fluidity and
context-dependence with which outsiders, and sometimes individuals
themselves, perceive racial identity. Far from ignoring the dangers of racial
classification, regarded-as case reasoning would take them head on.

339
See Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 15, at 1289 (arguing that courts should recognize
discrimination claims based on presumptions of a certain characteristic, such as being “regarded as”
black, which includes any corresponding negative stereotypes); see also Goodwin, supra note 338, at
932 (describing the historical “collective negative imaging of blacks” as too immature and intellectually
inferior to be granted fundamental rights).
340
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 20 at 6–7.
341
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) (holding that to satisfy strict
scrutiny and permit universities to use racial classifications, “[t]he reviewing court must ultimately be
satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternative would produce the educational benefits of diversity”);
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds
and races through [non-race-conscious] means . . . .”).
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A. The “Regarded-As” Standard under the ADA, the ADAAA, and Title VII
In 1990, with the passage of the ADA, Congress seemed intent on
including those perceived as disabled within the protections of the law.342 A
House Report stated:
In the employment context, if a person is disqualified on the
basis of an actual or perceived physical or mental condition,
and the employer can articulate no legitimate job-related
reason for the rejection, a perceived concern about employing
persons with disabilities would be inferred and the plaintiff
would qualify for coverage under the “regarded as” test.343
Following the passage of the ADA, the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance
similarly covered those regarded as disabled:
An individual rejected from a job because of the ‘myths, fears
and stereotypes’ associated with disabilities would be covered
under this part of the definition of disability . . . whether or not
the individual’s actual physical or mental condition would be
considered a disability under the first or second part of this
definition.344
According to the Interpretive Guidance, an individual proceeding under
this theory would have to show that an employer believed that a worker was
disabled because of “myths, fears, or stereotypes.”345 After the courts
restricted relief for those perceived as disabled, the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) clarified the definition of
disability.346 Under the ADAAA, a person meets the regarded-as prong “if
the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action
prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to
limit a major life activity.”347
A handful of cases have developed a doctrinal framework for the
ADAAA’s regarded-as prong. In Hilton v. Wright, a former state prisoner
suffering from the Hepatitis-C Virus brought suit with several other inmates
allegedly denied antiviral treatments because of past alcoholism or drug
342
Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to
Reinvigorate the “Regarded As” Prong of the Statutory Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993,
997–998; Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What
Happened - Why - And What Can We Do about It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 91, 140 (2000).
343
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 1, at 470–71 (1990).
344
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (1997).
345
Id.
346
See, e.g., Befort, supra note 342, at 1016–17 (explaining the changes Congress made to the
statute to broaden the definition of disability).
347
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(a) (2012).
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abuse.
Hilton argued that the Department of Correctional Services
(DOCS) discriminated against him and others similarly situated because
they were regarded as disabled.349
In addressing Hilton’s claim, the Second Circuit elaborated on the
standard for a regarded-as suit under the ADAAA.350 At least at the summary
judgment stage, Hilton would have to bring forth evidence only that DOCS
regarded him as having a physical or mental impairment, regardless of how
severe they believed that impairment to be.351
Several courts have also fleshed out what might count as evidence that
an employer regarded an individual as disabled. In Gil v. Vortex, L.L.C., the
court rejected the defendant-employer’s motion to dismiss the employee’s
disability-discrimination claim.352 The court found evidence that the
employer regarded the plaintiff as disabled when the employer required the
plaintiff to submit additional medical documentation, expressed concern
about the plaintiff’s disability when talking to his daughter, and required the
plaintiff to submit to tests not applicable to any other employee.353 In
addition to differential treatment, courts look at an employer’s comments as
evidence that a worker was regarded as disabled.354 Consider, for example,
Darcy v. City of New York, in which the plaintiff, a police officer, brought a
disability-discrimination claim based on his superiors’ belief that he was an
alcoholic.355 In rejecting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the
court relied on evidence that an employer had called the plaintiff an
alcoholic, knew he associated with supposed alcoholics, and transferred him
to a less desirable position five months later.356 Consistently, when deciding
cases under the ADAAA, courts have not required proof that an individual
actually had an impairment. In other words, courts do not have to determine
either how serious an employer believed a disability to be, or whether a
worker suffered from a disability at all.
To a limited extent, the courts have imported the regarded-as standard
into race-discrimination cases. The EEOC has consistently maintained that
misperception should not be a defense to either race or national origin
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697 F. Supp. 2d 234, 244 (D. Mass. 2010).
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357

discrimination.
The EEOC Compliance Manual prohibits race
discrimination, including
discrimination against an individual based on a belief that the
individual is a member of a particular racial group, regardless
of how the individual identifies himself. Discrimination
against an individual based on a perception of his or her race
violates Title VII even if that perception is wrong.358
While some federal circuit courts treat misperception as a defense,359
others follow the EEOC in concluding that those regarded as minorities
suffer real harm. Consider the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in EEOC v.
WC&M Enterprises.360 Mohammed Rafiq, a practicing Muslim from India,
found his workplace dramatically different in the aftermath of September
11, 2001.361 In addition to making comments on Rafiq’s religion, his
coworkers repeatedly called him “an Arab” and a “Taliban.”362 Rafiq
suffered because coworkers regarded him as Arab, treating religion as a
proxy for national origin and ethnicity.
Rafiq filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which later
brought a hostile work environment claim on Rafiq’s behalf.363 The district
court had rejected Rafiq’s national-origin discrimination claim, reasoning
that no one had targeted Rafiq for being from India.364 Relying on the
EEOC’s Guidance, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, suggesting that the hostility
a worker faces is just as substantial in cases of misperception.365 As the court
explained: “[A] party is able to establish a discrimination claim based on its
own national origin even though the discriminatory acts do not identify the
victim’s actual country of origin.”366

357
On the EEOC’s position on the issue, see, for example, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, 915.005, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION 3–4, 7 (2016);
Employment Discrimination Based on Religion, Ethnicity, or Country of Origin, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/fs-relig_ethnic.cfm [https://perma.cc/LZW7TZ9N] (last visited June 27, 2014).
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U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 915.003, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 15, at 15-5
(2006), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8ZZ-DZZQ].
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360
496 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007).
361
Id. at 396.
362
Id. at 395
363
Id. at 397.
364
Id.
365
See id. at 401 (discussing the EEOC’s guidelines on discrimination and the definitions contained
within).
366
Id.

330

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:2

In Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, the Eleventh Circuit similarly
recognized the harm of racial misperception.367 Jones, who identified as
African-American, began training for a road driver position.368 Jones’s
race-discrimination argument relied partly on statements made by his
co-worker, Kenneth Terrell, during a week-long training session.369 At that
time, Terrell told Jones: “I know how to train you Indians.”370 When Jones
responded that he was not Indian, Terrell replied: “I don’t care what race
you are, I trained your kind before.”371 Terrell went on to call Jones an
“Indian” several more times over the course of the conversation.372
In evaluating Jones’ hostile work environment claim, the Eleventh
Circuit considered how much weight to attach to Terrell’s statements,
particularly since he had misidentified Jones.373 While recognizing that
Jones was “neither Native American nor Indian,” the court insisted that “a
harasser’s use of epithets associated with a different ethnic or racial minority
than the plaintiff will not necessarily shield an employer from liability for a
hostile work environment.”374 Whatever stereotypes Terrell applied to
Indians may well have affected Jones, regardless of how he categorized
himself. “The fact that [a co-worker] ignorantly used the wrong derogatory
ethnic remark toward the plaintiff,” the court reasoned, “is
inconsequential.”375
The Ninth Circuit stated the rationale for rejecting a
racial-misperception defense in Amos v. City of Page Arizona.376 There,
Burton Amos got in a car accident, crossing the center line and colliding
with another vehicle.377 Informed that Amos had exited his vehicle and likely
suffered from serious injuries, the police conducted a brief search before
their flashlight batteries died.378 The police did not look for Amos again for
more than a month.379 Tourists would ultimately find Burton’s remains one
year later.380 Representatives from Burton’s estate learned that law
enforcement routinely waited to conduct searches nearby, since the area
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where Burton vanished bordered the Navajo Indian Reservation. Burton
was white, but his perceived race seems to have dictated the officers’
actions.382 Believing that Native Americans involved in car accidents often
fled the scene, reached the reservation, and called in the next day, officers
might have cut short the search for Burton based on a mistaken belief about
his ethnicity.383 Burton’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that
law enforcement “violated the Equal Protection Clause by selectively
withholding protective services” based on his perceived ethnicity.384
The City argued that Amos’s Estate had no standing to bring a claim
because Amos was white and did not belong to the class of persons that the
City had stereotyped or mistreated.385 The lower court had adopted this
reasoning in dismissing the Estate’s equal protection claim, reasoning that
antidiscrimination protections help to rectify the effects of past
subordination that Amos, a white man, likely never experienced.386 The
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, relying on the harms Amos suffered
because of his perceived identity.387 First, the court recognized that the
consequences for Amos did not change because he was white, and the injury
he suffered was no less real.388 Stereotyping, the court recognized, was just
as malevolent when an actor chose the “wrong” victim.389
Taken together, Amos, Jones, and WC & M Enterprises reveal that
regarded-as discrimination cuts across racial lines, affecting those who
identify as minorities and those who do not. These cases show how racial
proxies and stereotypes influence how individuals perceive, judge, and treat
one another. These cases bolster the case for separating the stereotypes
associated with race from skin color. Regardless of how a person categorizes
herself, the judgments and generalizations associated with perceived race
can do far-reaching harm.
But how can the courts translate regarded-as reasoning in the context of
postsecondary admissions? Exploring admissions officers’ efforts to comply
with the Supreme Court’s affirmative-action jurisprudence illuminates one
potentially constructive answer to this question.

381

Id. at 1090.
See id. (stating that the Page City Attorney indicated that “it is standard practice for the police
not to conduct thorough searches for runaway drivers because they suspect most are Native Americans
who will call in the next day”).
383
Id.
384
Id. at 1092–93.
385
Id. at 1086, 1093.
386
Id. at 1094.
387
Id.
388
Id.
389
Id.
382

332

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:2

B. Race, Regarded-As Reasoning, and Affirmative Action
Almost inevitably, the courts will soon address the question dividing the
Court in Fisher II: whether the race-conscious remedies discussed in Grutter
v. Bollinger and Parents Involved v. Seattle can ever pass constitutional
muster in a world in which racial identity is socially constructed and
ever-changing. How can the courts justify any antisubordination measure
designed to protect the members of a particular race when it is impossible to
offer a principled definition of race itself?
Drawing on the ADAAA, courts should view affirmative action as
justified and coherent when an individual is regarded as belonging to a
particular race. As under the ADAAA, the question should not be whether
that person actually has a particular racial background or even whether a
decision maker views that racial background negatively. Instead, the
analysis should turn on simple perception of race.
However, using regarded-as reasoning in the context of postsecondary
admissions raises unique challenges. In the employment context, as Bertrand
and Mullainathan have shown, perceived racial identity can count as a strike
against a potential hire or worker.390 By contrast, in postsecondary
education, many admission officers view minority status favorably. In
studying admissions practices at seventy-five of the nation’s most
competitive universities, scholar Rachel Rubin found that most admissions
officers heavily weighed an applicant’s “fit” with the university in
question.391 When asked to define fit, officers attached the most importance
to an applicant’s membership in an underrepresented minority.392 Rubin’s
conclusions reinforce the findings of earlier studies, explaining that
members of underrepresented minorities (along with legacy students and
those with SAT scores higher than 1500) receive the greatest preference.393
Moreover, in the university setting, because applicants often identify
themselves by race, the odds of opportunistic behavior are higher.394 In the
390
See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 326, at 1–3, 10 (discussing the differences in callback
rates for job applicants based on their perceived race).
391
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392
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2018]

WHAT IS RACE?

333

workplace, employers cannot select workers by race or even ask about the
identity of a potential hire.395 Because students have more control over the
process of racial categorization, the risk of self-serving behavior is naturally
higher.
Finally, the evidentiary strategies used in ADAAA and race
discrimination cases seem to be a poor fit in the context of university
admissions. In employment cases, courts rely on off-color comments,
adverse employment actions, and comparator evidence to smoke out
regarded-as discrimination.396 Given the confidentiality surrounding
university admissions and the different ways in which applicants categorize
themselves by race, this kind of evidence seems unlikely to surface.
However, the United States Departments of Education and Justice’s
Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race in Postsecondary Admissions (the
Guidance) suggests that some universities have already adopted regarded-as
reasoning.397 Under Grutter, Parents Involved, and their progeny, as the
Guidance asserts, universities must first justify why diversity counts as a
compelling state interest.398
Centrally, however, the Guidance addresses how to create a diverse
student body without recourse to racial categorization. The Guidance
encourages admissions officers to turn first to race-neutral alternatives to
achieve obviously race-conscious outcomes. “In selecting among
race-neutral approaches,” the Guidance explains, “you may take into
account the racial impact of various choices.”399 The Guidance next explores
year, the number of racial categories available to select increased dramatically, as the Department of
Education ordered universities to comply with a federal edict to collect more information on race and
ethnicity. See, e.g., Susan Saulny & Jacques Steinberg, On College Forms, a Question of Race, or Races,
Can Perplex, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/us/14admissions.html?
pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/9ZVK-7K29] (“[S]tudents can now choose from a menu of new boxes
of racial and ethnic categories . . . . The change has made it easier for students to claim a multiracial
identity—highlighting those parts of their backgrounds they might want to bring to the fore and
disregarding others . . . .”).
395
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how admissions officers might identify minority applicants without turning
to racial categories. Rather than explicitly asking about race, as the Guidance
states, universities may rely on proxies, including “socioeconomic status,”
“the educational level attained by parents,” “first-generation college status,”
“marked residential instability,” or “enrollment in a low-performing school
or district.”400 While officially race-neutral, these criteria allow officers to
identify applicants they regard as minorities. The Guidance treats these
proxies as strategies that “would assist in drawing students from different
racial backgrounds to the institution.”401
Most obviously, regarded-as reasoning allows universities invested in
racial diversity to proceed in spite of the Court’s decisions in Grutter,
Parents Involved, and Fisher I and II. In Fisher I, Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion reminded universities that to satisfy strict scrutiny, “[t]he
reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”402 Using
race-neutral proxies appears to allow admissions officers to achieve a
desired result without resorting to racial categorization.
In defining race, the courts should look to how admissions officers
identify students. By acknowledging and analyzing the way in which
admissions officers deal with students’ race, the Court can better capture the
reality of racial identity, both as college applicants experience it and
admissions officers perceive it. As Saperstein and Penner have shown,
outsiders’ perception of another’s racial identity—and even an individual’s
understanding of herself—varies depending on the surrounding
circumstances.403 And as Bertrand and Mullainathan indicate, the
stereotypes and judgments surrounding race do damage regardless of a
person’s “true” identity.404
Furthermore, if the Court relies on evidence of a person’s perceived
race, the risk of opportunism might decrease, since there is anecdotal
evidence that admissions officers sometimes already use regarded-as
reasoning to detect and resist self-serving behavior. Rather than taking an
applicant’s self-categorization at face value, admissions officers at Rice
University “try to reconcile whatever boxes an applicant may have checked
with the rest of the application.”405 Some admissions officers at Rice used a
400
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specific essay question about “unique life experiences and cultural
traditions” to filter out applicants who were insincere about a particular
racial identity.406 Another former admissions officer interviewed by the
Huffington Post explained that her colleagues had used proxies when
students refused to answer questions about race, believing that officers
discriminated against Asian or Caucasian applicants.407 In particular, she
described how officers used a student’s name, parents’ name, or school of
origin to determine racial identity.408 As this anecdotal evidence suggests,
courts focusing on an individual’s perceived identity might more effectively
check the kind of self-serving behavior that Schuette and the Fisher II
dissenters foreground.
Nonetheless, in the university setting, regarded-as reasoning represents
a far from perfect solution. Critics of Grutter and its progeny have long
insisted that the Court’s approach to diversity encourages universities to
conceal their true objectives.409 First, diversity jurisprudence encourages
decision-makers to play down the remedial interest in addressing the effects
of past race discrimination that likely motivates many admissions officers.410
By prohibiting quotas and other quantitative approaches to affirmative
action, the Court encourages officers to obscure how much race matters to
admissions decisions.411 By focusing on how admissions officers evaluate
students’ racial identity, the Court can acknowledge the social construction
of race while recognizing the ways in which perceived race impacts
individual outcomes. However, at least in the affirmative-action context,
regarded-as approaches to race seem to ratify admissions officers’ efforts to
achieve a race-specific outcome without admitting their true intentions. To
the extent that a regarded-as approach represents an effort to comply with
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Grutter and its progeny, it may once again allow officers and courts to deny
the extent to which racial categorization still drives admissions decisions.
Regarded-as approaches may also be over- or underinclusive, given a
university’s genuine interest in diversity. First, by focusing on variables like
socioeconomic class, such an approach may fail to capture the disadvantaged
minority students that affirmative-action programs would ideally assist.412
As importantly, by failing to address all self-serving behavior, regarded-as
approaches may give an unfair advantage to students more successfully able
to simulate a favored racial identity. From the standpoint of individual
students, regarded-as approaches ignore the importance of a student’s sense
of identity. Regardless of whether or not it is constructed, racial identity can
play a crucial role in how an individual sees herself and her place in the
community.413 By relying so heavily on what outsiders think, regarded-as
approaches do not do justice to students’ understandings of themselves.
Just the same, regarded-as reasoning provides the best path for courts
faced with a Hobson’s choice: categorizing individuals by race or rejecting
all antisubordination remedies that touch on racial differences. Recognizing
the impact of perceived racial differences allows courts to rationalize
affirmative action policies without assuming the validity of racial categories.
Should courts ever have to adjudicate race, in the context of affirmative
action or otherwise, an existing (albeit developing) legal framework exists
to provide guidance.
Regarded-as reasoning may also work effectively to allow universities
to address past subordination without running up against constitutional
prohibitions on racial classifications. Recent work published by the Harvard
Journal of Law and Policy studied the impact of a proxy program developed
at the University of Colorado Boulder.414 Prior to 2009, the University used
socioeconomic class instead of race in admissions decisions.415 By 2010, the
University had turned to a race-plus-class model.416 A 2009 study found that
officers admitted 9 percent more underrepresented minorities under the race-
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blind policy. In evaluating the race-plus-class approach, a 2010 study
concluded that it had resulted in a 13-percent increase in acceptance rates
for the poorest students, a 17-percent increase for underrepresented minority
students, and a 32 percent-increase in the lowest-income, minority
students.418 At least some well-tailored proxy programs may make a
significant difference to minority enrollment.
In spite of its drawbacks, regarded-as reasoning offers a promising
solution for the dilemma outlined by affirmative-action opponents in Fisher
II. By defining racial identity according to others’ perception, regarded-as
reasoning reduces the threat of opportunism or self-serving behavior. It
captures the fact that racial proxies and all the stereotypes they represent
matter more than color or biological race. In this way, the challenge raised
by anti-affirmative-action advocates may create an unexpected new
opportunity. From equal protection to Title VII jurisprudence, commentators
have long faulted the courts for adopting a biological understanding of race
that is inaccurate and misleading. Forcing cause lawyers and the courts to
say what race means might finally provide a way forward.
CONCLUSION
It is tempting to view colorblind constitutionalism through the lens of
contemporary politics. Opposition to affirmative action has become a
signature position of the political Right, synonymous with faith in the free
market, emphasis on the harms created by racial classifications, and concern
about discrimination against whites. The history of opposition to affirmative
action shows, however, that the politics of colorblindness have been
contested and complex. The players and terms of the anti-affirmative-action
debate have changed considerably over time, and the form of “reactionary”
colorblindness familiar to us from the dissents of Justices Thomas and Scalia
developed only recently.
Viewed in historical context, the stakes of Fisher II become clearer.
More than ever before, the Supreme Court has come to grapple with what
race means. However, the Court’s growing awareness of the social
construction of race has created new challenges for supporters of an
antisubordination vision of the Constitution. Opponents of affirmative
action have marshalled new arguments, borrowing from the claims long
advanced by historians and CRT theorists. These activists argue that if race
is artificial, race-conscious admissions programs are unfair, arbitrary, and
easy to manipulate.
Nevertheless, future battles over affirmative action may open up an
unexpected opportunity. Those on opposing sides of the affirmative-action
issue have come to an uneasy consensus that racial identities are fluid,
417
418
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contested, and socially determined. Perhaps for the first time, in using
regarded-as reasoning, discrimination jurisprudence will come to grips with
what race means in modern America.

